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ALL THAT HEAVEN WILL ALLOW: A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE COEXISTENCE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
AND GAY MATRIMONIAL BANS
DEIRDRE M. BOWENt
ABSTRACT
This Article offers the first analysis to date of national data evaluat-
ing whether defense of marriage acts (mini or super-DOMAs) preserve
and stabilize the family. After finding that they do not-just as same-sex
marriage does not appear to destabilize families-the Article analyzes
what variables are, in fact, associated with family stability. Specifically,
those variables are: families below the poverty line; men and women
married three or more times; religiosity; percent conservative versus lib-
eral in a state; disposable income; percent with a bachelor's degree; and
median age of first marriage. States that are more likely to have enacted a
DOMA are also more likely to have high divorce or never-married rates.
And in turn, these same states are more likely to include poor families, in
which people marry young, are highly religious, and are politically con-
servative.
Next, the Article applies the sociological concepts of moral entre-
preneurism and moral panic, defined, respectively, as the practice of po-
litical groups labeling certain behavior as deviant, and the refraining of a
social phenomenon in moral terms to create an exaggerated sense of fear.
These concepts serve as the theoretical explanation for mini-DOMAs'
continued entrenchment, even in the face of the U.S. Supreme Court's
Windsor decision that struck down Section 3 of the federal DOMA. Fi-
nally, the Article offers pragmatic recommendations for achieving family
stability in light of mini-DOMAs' inability to succeed in this goal.
t Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. Many people deserve
thanks for their contributions to this Article: Professor Richard Delgado for his inspiration; Profes-
sors Jane Stover and Holning Lau for reading an earlier version of the Article. The Emerging Family
Law Scholars for their guidance at the incubator stage; my outstanding research assistants Sarah
Albertson, Stacie Naczelnik, Valerie Queseda, Peter Rudolf, and Carl Schremp; and my co-number
cruncher, Hayley A.B. Pippin.
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INTRODUCTION
Gareth used to prefer funerals to weddings. He said it was easier to
get enthusiastic about a ceremony one had an outside chance of
eventually being involved in.
-Four Weddings and a Funeral'
The evolving definition of marriage terrifies a lot of people.2 Yet,
for centuries, its meaning has constantly evolved. 3 Broadening the defini-
tion of marriage to include same-sex couples is just the latest iteration.
Within the past year,4 the United States Supreme Court struck down Sec-
tion 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act' (DOMA), thus allowing
legally married same-sex couples to receive all the same benefits as
straight couples.6 Specifically at issue in Section 3 was an overarching
federal definition of marriage as a "legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a per-
son of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."
The case rose on appeal from the Second Circuit, which determined
8that the statute contained an unconstitutional provision. The Court of
Appeals applied an equal protection analysis, defining gays and lesbians
1. FOUR WEDDINGS AND A FUNERAL (PolyGram Filmed Entertainment 1994).
2. For a recent example, one needs to look no further than the violent response to the passage
of a same-sex marriage law in France. Mark Memmott, Violent Protests in Paris After Same-Sex
Marriage Law Passes, TWO-WAY: BREAKING NEWS FROM NPR (Apr. 24, 2013, 8:04 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/04/24/178765718/violent-protests-in-paris-after-same-
sex-marriage-law-passes.
3. See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: How LOVE CONQUERED
MARRIAGE 5-9 (2006) (arguing that love as the motivation for marriage actually weakened the
institution).
4. The research for this Article is current as of February 5, 2014.
5. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I
U.S.C. § 7 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
6. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683-84, 2696. However, at the time of this analysis, it is unclear
which benefits from the over 1000 federal laws DOMA affected are transportable across state lines
into states that do not recognize same-sex marriage. President Obama's administration is currently
working to clarify these laws. Jeremy W. Peters, Federal Court Speaks, but Couples Still Face State
Legal Patchwork, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2013, at A22.
7. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
8. On December 7, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of
certiorari for the Second Circuit cases combined under Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). In addition, the Court heard California's Proposition
8 case, Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). However, before the Supreme Court decided Windsor and Hollingsworth,
the First Circuit ruled that DOMA was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Massachusetts v.
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10-11, 13, 15 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). Prior to this ruling, other U.S. district courts had ruled
on the constitutionality of DOMA. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294,
347 (D. Conn. 2012). The trial court in Windsor granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment. The trial court declined to hold that the plaintiffs deserved heightened scrutiny as a suspect
class, but did hold that DOMA's articulated goals do not pass even the most deferential rational
basis review. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 401-02, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding
a state's interests behind DOMA not based in reality and thus plaintiffs motion for summary judg-
ment was granted), affd, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), affd, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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as a quasi-suspect class, to determine that the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group (BLAG) could offer no legitimate reason for DOMA's enact-
ment.9 The Supreme Court declined to speak to equal protection, but
instead applied a federalism and an animus analysis.'o It concluded that
the motivations behind the enactment of DOMA were hostile to a politi-
cally unpopular group." Ultimately, the Court held that by injuring
same-sex married couples, Section 3 of DOMA violated the Fifth
Amendment.12 Justice Scalia's scathing and colorful dissent proclaimed
that such an analysis invites a challenge to all state DOMAs. 3
Yet, like the supporters of the federal DOMA, supporters of state
DOMAs consistently assert that a DOMA is needed to "protect" our so-
ciety-to strengthen and protect traditional marriage, the cornerstone of
civilization.14 In other words, banning same-sex marriage protects tradi-
tional marriage.
Does DOMA really protect the institution of marriage? This Article
offers an empirical investigation of that question and concludes that
DOMAs provide no measurable benefit to the protection of families. 5
This conclusion raises the question whether a state DOMA could even
pass a "rational basis plus" standard,16 much less the animus standard,
9. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 176, 185.
10. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. Animus herein refers to a legislative objective, but the
"desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group." Id.
(quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
11. See id.
12. Id. at 2696.
13. See id at 2709-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on a case
that challenged the constitutionality of California's state DOMA amendment. However, the Court
declined to hear the case and remanded it back to the Ninth Circuit for dismissal because the peti-
tioners did not have standing. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659. Mini-DOMA refers to those stat-
utes that states enacted mirroring the federal DOMA statute. Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recog-
nition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143,
2165-94 (2005).
14. See, e.g., Bishops' Committee for Defense of Marriage Disappointed over DOMA Ruling,
U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (June 1, 2012), available at http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-
096.cfm (quoting Bishop Cordileone, who declared, "The federal appeals court in Boston did a grave
injustice yesterday by striking down that part of the Defense of Marriage Act that reasonably recog-
nizes the reality that marriage is the union of one man and one woman. DOMA is part of our na-
tion's long-established body of law rooted in the true meaning of marriage. Hopefully, this unjust
ruling will be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, for the benefit of our nation's children, and our
nation as a whole." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Karla Dial, Ist Circuit Declares Part of
Federal Marriage Law Unconstitutional, CITIZENLINK (May 31, 2012),
http://www.citizenlink.com/2012/05/31/Ist-circuit-declares-part-of-federal-marriage-law-
unconstitutionall (quoting Alliance Defense Fund Legal Counsel Dale Schowengerdt, who said,
"Society should protect and strengthen marriage, not undermine it. The federal Defense of Marriage
Act provides that type of protection, and we trust the U.S. Supreme Court will reverse the Ist Cir-
cuit's erroneous decision." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15. I use the phrases "at-risk families" and "families-in-crisis" interchangeably to refer to the
rhetoric employed around the weakening family structure-i.e. family formation without marriage or
family cycles that include divorce and perhaps remarriage and perhaps divorce again.
16. "Rational basis plus" loosely refers to a fourth standard of review for laws challenged on
equal protection or due process grounds. Rather than offering the traditional deference to the state's
argument that that the alleged discrimination in the law serves a governmental interest, the courts
[Vol. 91:2280
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that at least one federal district court has applied.17 And, if future DOMA
challengers adopt "animus" as a legal theory, this Article offers support
for the notion that some level of hostility towards gay and lesbian cou-
ples may have inspired at least some of the enactors of state DOMAs.
Most importantly, the "DOMA as protectorate" discourse serves
certain constituencies' interests quite effectively.' 8 The reason why is
fully explored in this Article because, in light of the Windsor decision,
the discourse will remain a vibrant part of the same-sex marriage debate
for some time to come.
Next, the Article examines another question: If DOMA is so clearly
not associated with strengthening family (and marriage)-yet poverty,
education, and economic opportunities clearly are-why, then, does
DOMA carry the political and legal traction that it does? Understanding
this analysis is crucial in the face of the Court's decision and analysis.
The federal DOMA is no longer applicable in states permitting same-sex
marriage, yet the progeny of the federal DOMA are thriving in thirty-two
states. 19 The broadening definition of marriage and the evolution of fami-
ly will remain in the forefront of our national, legal, political, and cultur-
al consciousness. Thus, understanding how and why state DOMAs can-
demand a more searching explanation of the government interest. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 631-35 (1996).
17. Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 334-35 (D. Conn. 2012). In
addition, the First Circuit court engaged in a novel analytical approach to determine that a demon-
strated connection was missing between DOMA's treatment of same-sex couples and its goal of
strengthening the bonds and benefits of marriage. The First Circuit rejected the heightened-scrutiny
standard in favor of what it coined a "more careful assessment" than that offered by "conventional
rational basis review." Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11 (1st
Cir. 2012). Indeed, only certain types of rationales with a certain level of "force" are acceptable
under this "rational basis plus" standard of review. Id. at 8. However, applying the "rational basis
plus" standard of review, the First Circuit decided that DOMA's articulated goal was unacceptable.
Id. at 15.
18. 1 posit that those who possess socio-economic political power benefit from focusing
attention on DOMA as the key method of saving families in crisis. The discourse distracts from the
stark reality that the lack of investment in the resources needed for these families contradicts with
the concentration of wealth that the political elite have always enjoyed. Moreover, it distracts from
the divestiture in social structures that would support not only families subsisting on the margins but
also the dissipating lower middle class who used to make up the "settled working class." See JOAN
C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 155-56,
165 (2010).
This Article explores why, in spite of empirical evidence to the contrary, DOMA holds
such an attraction to the very families who would most benefit from a radical shift in family policy
rather than the empty shell of legislation written in the name of protecting families. See, e.g., Press
Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Seattle, City Formally Joins Effort to Challenge Constitution-
ality of Federal "Defense of Marriage Act" (July 10, 2012), available at
http://mayormcginn.seattle.gov/city-joins-effort-to-challenge-federal-defense-of-marriage-act/
("More fundamentally, we are joining large and small, public and private entities across the country
that recognize that DOMA serves no good purpose-it just forces employers to treat valued employ-
ees unfairly, by denying them equality in important family resources such as COBRA, Social Securi-
ty benefits and pensions." (quoting City Attorney Pete Holmes) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
19. See generally State-Level Marriage Equality, MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://www.marriageequality.org/sites/default/files/National%2OMap%20%2320%20%2806-Jan-
2014%29.pdf (providing a map showing states still unwilling to fully accept marriage equality).
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not offer a salve to the notion of the family "in crisis" is a focal point of
the Article. In addition, the Article offers some novel recommendations
for moving beyond the distraction that DOMAs appear to create, to allow
for family stability regardless of whether or not states permit same-sex
marriage.
When Congress passed DOMA, one of four reasons advanced for
DOMA's necessity was to defend and nurture the institution of tradition-
al heterosexual marriage. 20 Indeed, the congressional report stated:
Certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and
necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth,
fit to take rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that
which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as
consisting in and springing from the union for hife of one man and
one woman in the holy state of matrimony; the sure foundation of all
that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that
reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in so-
cial and political improvement.21
Congress went on to preempt the argument that the institution of mar-
riage was already under attack by divorce when it proclaimed that same-
22
sex marriage was an inherently flawed social experiment. To permit the
practice would further devalue an institution already reeling from no-
fault divorce, the sexual revolution, and out-of-wedlock births.23 Ulti-
mately, Congress asserted in this report that the time had come to "re-
build a family culture based on enduring marital relationships." 24
And certainly, one of the key rationales that BLAG offered in
Windsor to support DOMA emphasizes this idea of rebuilding the family
20. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12 (1996).
21. Id (emphasis added) (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885)).
22. Id at 15; see also David J. Herzig, DOMA and Diffusion Theory: Ending Animus Legisla-
tion Through a Rational Basis Approach, 44 AKRON L. REV. 621, 656 n.244 (2011). "[N]o society
that has lived through the transition to homosexuality and the perversion which it lives and what it
brought forth." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H7444 (daily ed. July 11, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Tom Coburn)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The very foundations of our
society are in danger of being burned. The flames of hedonism, the flames of narcissism, the flames
of self-centered morality are licking at the very foundations of our society. . . ." Id. (omission in
original) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H7482 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bob Barr))
(internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Brief for Attorney General, Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint and in Support of Commonwealth's
Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F.
Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-l I 156-JLT), 2010 WL 581804 ("Members of Congress
repeatedly condemned homosexuality in the floor debates surrounding DOMA's passage, calling
[the practicel 'immoral,' 'based on perversion,' [(quoting 142 CONG. REC. H7444 (daily ed. July II,
1996) (statement of Rep. Coburn))] 'unnatural,' [(quoting 142 CONG.REC. H7494 (daily ed. July 12,
1996) (statement of Rep. Smith))] 'depraved,' and 'an attack upon God's principles.' [(quoting 142
CONG. REC. H7486 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Buyer))]").
23. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 15 (1996).
24. Id; see also 142 CONG. REC. 22334 (Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms)
(arguing that DOMA "will safeguard the sacred institutions of marriage and the family from those
who seek to destroy them and who are willing to tear apart America's moral fabric in the process").
[Vol. 91:2282
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using the institution of traditional marriage.25 During oral arguments, the
topic of whether children are best raised in a stable heterosexual mar-
riage was front and center for Justice Kennedy, the swing vote, and the
26author of the opinion. And, frustrated with the intractable cultural and
philosophical problem, the Court noted that the Perry v. Schwarzenegger
district court found that "[p]ermitting same-sex couples to marry will not
affect the number of opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit,
have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of op-
,,27posite-sex marriages. But, what the Court ultimately considered,
among other things, is the idea that a diversity of governance requires the
federal government to respect states' choices regarding marriage-
including the choice to allow same-sex marriage. 2 8
The Supreme Court has in the last fifty years demanded "closer
scrutiny of government action touching upon minority group interests
and of federal action in areas of traditional state concern." 29 And indeed,
the Court's language in the Windsor opinion makes quite clear that while
it offers considerably broad deference to the states to define marriage as
they see fit, each state's motivation behind the definition may not neces-
sarily be beyond constitutional reproach.o In signaling so, the Court has
fueled the debate about mini-DOMAs' actual ability to preserve family
stability and marriage for the foreseeable future.31
The Supreme Court DOMA ruling has substantial historical and so-
cial significance.32 As observed above, the federal DOMA's demise of-
fers less immediate relief for those gay and lesbian families who wish to
wed, but who reside in states with statutes or constitutional amendments
barring same-sex marriage. Many of those states' mini-DOMAs current-
ly remain intact.33 Given that twenty-nine states have statutes barring
25. See Reply Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the
United States House of Representatives at 12-15, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307).
26. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 93, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307).
27. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 n.7 (citing Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,
972 (N.D. Cal. 2010), finding of fact number 55). See also Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2012) ("DOMA does not . .. explain how denying benefits to
same-sex couples will reinforce heterosexual marriage.").
28. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691.
29. U.S. Dep't ofHealth & Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 16.
30. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
31. Recall, mini-DOMAs are state versions of the federal DOMA. See supra note 13.
32. See Daniel Fisher, DOMA Is Dead. So Where Does That Leave Gay Couples?, FORBES
(Mar. 28, 2013, 11:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/03/28/doma-is-dead-so-
where-does-that-leave-gay-couples/.
33. William Saletan, Gay Bells in Bondage: Most Americans Now Support Gay Marriage. But
They Can't Legalize It, Thanks to the Voters of 2004, SLATE (June 28, 2011, 8:58 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/frame game/2011/06/gaybells in bondage.html.
But see Anna Staver, Same-Sex Marriage Amendment in Ohio Gets Green Light, HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr. 3, 2012, 6:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/03/same-sex-marriage-
amendment-ohio n_1400714.html?ncid=edlinkusaolpOO000009 (explaining that Ohio may vote to
overturn its 2004 Constitutional Amendment banning same-sex marriage).
2014] 283
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same-sex marriage and twenty-nine states have constitutional amend-
ments that prohibit the practice, 34 it is a worthy exercise to explore
whether these states have reaped the benefits that they hoped to achieve
by enacting mini-DOMAs. 35
The empirical analysis reveals two conclusions. First, states that en-
acted a mini-DOMA did so for virtually the same reasons as the federal
government. Second, mini-DOMAs do not appear to be achieving their
articulated goals. Moreover, it appears that states that possess DOMA
statutes or constitutional amendments also espouse greater rates of relig-
iosity, experience larger rates of poverty, divorce, and out-of-wedlock
births, in addition to experiencing lower educational rates and marriage
36
rates.
Thus, this Article discusses three issues: first, the methodology and
results of the empirical research; second, a theory as to why the articulat-
ed mini-DOMA goals of family stability may persist despite the mini-
DOMAs' inability to meet those goals; and third, recommendations on
how we, as a country of states, can coexist with an evolving definition of
marriage and family, while developing and executing an effective policy
that supports all of these conceptions of family. 37
I. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Soon after DOMA went into effect, states began enacting mini-
DOMAs, 8 either by statute or state constitutional amendment, and some-
times both. 39 However, not all states adopted their own version of
34. See infra note 39. A notable example, Hawaii's Constitution's Second Amendment did
not ban same-sex marriage. Rather, it gave the legislature the authority to define marriage as it sees
fit. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (amended 1998) (permitting the Hawaii Legislature to authorize
same-sex marriage by passing the Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, S.B. 1, 27th Leg., 2d Spec.
Sess. (Haw. 2013)). Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, § 572-x (2013).
35. The First Circuit opinion did not address Section 2 of DOMA, which frees states that ban
same-sex marriage from having to recognize same-sex marriages performed in states that do license
homosexual matrimony. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 2012).
36. This empirical analysis is discussed in detail infra Part .C-D.
37. 1 do not review the history and background of DOMA, which have been explored in depth
elsewhere. See generally Julia Halloran McLaughlin, DOMA and the Constitutional Coming out of
Same-Sex Marriage, 24 Wis. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 145, 146-54 (2009); Barbara A. Robb, The
Constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act in the Wake of Romer v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 263, 286-93 (1997); Scott Titshaw, A Modest Proposal to Deport the Children of Gay Citizens,
& Etc.: Immigration Law, the Defense of Marriage Act and the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 25
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 446-73 (2011).
38. Mini-DOMAs preserve the word "marriage" to one man and one woman, "but not neces-
sarily the attributes of civil marriage," while super-DOMAs restrict terminology and deny all forms
of relationship recognition, i.e. civil unions, domestic partnerships, and reciprocal benefits, to same-
sex couples. Daniel R. Pinello, Location, Location, Location: Same-Sex Relationship Rights by State,
LAW TRENDS & NEWS: PRAC. AREA NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n), Fall 2009, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law-trends_news-practice-area e newsletter h
ome/bl feat5.htmi.
39. At the time of this analysis, thirty-three states have mini-DOMA legislation through their
constitution or statutory law; many states overlap and have both statutory and constitutional mini-
DOMAs. See State-Level Marriage Equality, supra note 19.
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At the time of this study, twenty-nine states have constitutional mini-DOMAs. See ALA.
CONST. art. 1, § 36.03 (ratified 2012); ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25 (approved 1998); ARIZ. CONST.
art. XXX, § I (approved 2008); ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § I (approved 2004); COLO. CONST. art. 11,
§ 31 (added 2006); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (added 2008); GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4 (ratified 2004);
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28 (added and ratified 2006); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (added 2005); KY.
CONST. § 233a (adopted 2004); LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (added 2004); MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25
(ratified 2004), held unconstitutional by DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285, 2014 WL 1100794
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014); MIss. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A (added 2004); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 33
(adopted 2004); MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 (approved 2004); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (adopted
2000); NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (added 2002) (proposed legislation to amend enrolled (S.J.R. 13,
77th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013))); N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6 (approved 2012); N.D. CONST. art. XI, §
28 (approved 2004); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (adopted 2004); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35 (adopt-
ed 2004); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (added 2004); S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15 (effective 2007); S.D.
CONST. art. XXI, § 9 (approved 2006); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18 (approved 2006); TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 32 (adopted 2005), held unconstitutional by De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-OLG,
2014 WL 715741 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014) (proposed legislation to repeal introduced (H.J.R. 11,
83rd Leg., 2nd Sess. (Tex. 2013))); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29 (adopted 2004), held unconstitutional
by Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013); VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (effective
2007), held unconstitutional by Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13cv395, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va. Feb.
13, 2014); WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13 (created 2007) (proposed legislation to repeal introduced
(S.J.R. 74, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014))). Four of those states currently afford partial marriage
rights to same-sex couples: Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Wisconsin. See State-Level Marriage
Equality, supra note 19.
At the time of this analysis, twenty-nine states have statutory mini-DOMAs. See ALA.
CODE § 30-1-19 (2013) (effective 1998); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.05.011, 25.05.013 (2013) (effective
1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-101, 25-112 (2013) (effective 1996) (proposed legislation to
amend introduced (S.B. 1165, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz 2013))); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109
(2013) (effective 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2013) (amended 2000); FLA. STAT. §
741.212 (2013) (effective 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2013) (effective 1996); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-201 (2013) (effective 1996); IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2013) (added 1997); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-2501 (2013) (effective 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.005, 402.020, 402.040,
402.045 (West 2013) (effective 1998); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (2013) (amended 1999); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 551.271, 551.272 (2013) (effective 1996) (proposed legislation to amend intro-
duced (H.B. 4909, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2013))); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (2013) (ap-
proved 1997); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (2013) (amended 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401
(2013) (amended 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2013) (effective 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
03-01, 14-03-08 (2013) (effective 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(A) (West 2013) (effec-
tive 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3.1 (2013) (effective 1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2013)
(effective 1996) (proposed legislation to amend introduced (H.B. 1686, 197th Gen. Assemb. (Pa.
2013-2014))); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (2013) (effective 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-1-1,
25-1-38 (2013) (effective 1996 and 2000, respectively); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2013) (effec-
tive 1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.001, 6.204 (2013) (effective 1997 and 2003, respectively)
(proposed legislation to repeal introduced (H.B. 20, 83rd Leg., 2d Sess. (Tex. 2013))); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 30-1-2, 30-1-4.1 (West 2013) (effective 1999 and 2004, respectively); VA. CODE ANN. H§
20-45.2, 20-45.3 (2013) (effective 1997 and 2004, respectively); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (2013)
(effective 2001); WIS. STAT. §§ 765.001(2), 765.01 (2013) (effective 2009); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-
1-101 (2013) (effective 1977) (proposed legislation redefining marriage introduced (H.B. 169, 62d
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013))). Despite their statutory mini-DOMAs, Colorado and Wisconsion
afford partial marriage rights to same-sex couples. See State-Level Marriage Equality, supra note 19.
Recently, in Kitchen v. Herbert, Utah's constitutional and statutory mini-DOMAs were
held unconstitutional. 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013). However, the United States Supreme
Court granted a stay on the recognition of same-sex marriages in the state. Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S.
Ct. 893 (mem.) (2014).
In November 2012, mini-DOMAs in Maine, Maryland, and Washington were usurped by
popular referenda legalizing same-sex marriage. See generally A Festive Mood in Maine as Same-
Sex Marriage Becomes Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2012, at A20; Ashley Fantz, Washington Voters
Pass Same-Sex Marriage, CNN Projects, CNN POLITICS (Nov. 9, 2012, 15:21 EST),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/ll/09/us/washington-passes-same-sex-marriage/index.html; Associated,
Press, Many Weddings as Gay Marriage Becomes Legal in Md., USA TODAY (Jan. 1, 2013, 17:41
EST), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/01/same-sex-marriage-
maryland/1801917/.
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DOMA, i.e. a mini- or super-DOMA, 4 0 and in the wake of the federal
legislation, some states chose to find some parallel version of marriage in
the form of civil unions41 or domestic partnerships instead.42 Further-
more, a select few states, initially through court action, later by voter
referenda, came to permit same-sex marriage or at least recognize same-
sex marriages performed in other states even though, at one time, the
state may have enacted a mini-DOMA.43 Thus, differing state reactions
Prior to November 2012's vote, Maine, Maryland, and Washington had the following
statutory DOMAs in place: ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 701(5) (1997) (repealed 2012); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (West 1984) (repealed 2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1998)
(repealed 2012). But see S.B. 241, 430th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012) (Civil Marriage
Protection Act defines marriage as between "two individuals," rather than between "a man and a
woman" as previously stated, effective Oct. 1, 2012).
40. For example, Colorado recognizes civil unions between same-sex partners. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-15-102 (West 2013). To date, the following states have not enacted mini-DOMA
legislation: Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the District of Colombia.
41. Up through 2013, only two states, New Mexico and Rhode Island, recognized out-of-state
same-sex marriages. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-4 (West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-8 (2013).
42. Nevada and Oregon provide the equivalent of state-level spousal rights to same-sex cou-
ples in the form of domestic partnerships. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 122A.100, 122A.200 (West
2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.305 (West 2013). Washington voters approved same-sex mar-
riage, but the state legislature recognized that marriage may still be impracticable for some couples.
http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/pdf/FLHBDomesticPartnershipEdition.pdf In response,
Washington continues to recognize domestic partnerships. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.010 (2013)
(effective until June 30, 2014) (to be replaced by Referendum Measure No. 74, approved Nov. 6,
2012)). Wisconsin provides limited spousal rights to same-sex couples in the form of domestic
partnerships. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 770.05 (West 2013); Maureen McCollum, State Supreme Court to
Hear Challenge to Domestic Partnership Law, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 21, 2013, 12:05 PM),
http://news.wpr.org/post/wi-supreme-court-hear-challenge-domestic-partnership-law (listing some of
the limited benefits granted to domestic partnerships including "hospital visitation rights, inheritance
access, and family medical leave").
43. At the time of this analysis, the following states and jurisdictions issue marriage licenses
(or an equivalent status) to same-sex couples: California, see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652
(2013) (holding that the appellants, opponents of same-sex marriage, did not have standing to chal-
lenge the ruling that Proposition 8 violated the California Constitution)); Connecticut, see Kerrigan
v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that laws restricting civil marriage
to heterosexual couples violated same-sex couples' state constitutional equal protection rights);
Delaware, Civil Marriage Equality and Religious Freedom Act of 2013, Del. H.B. 75 (2013) (enact-
ed); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 46-401 (2010); Hawaii, S.B. 1, 27th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess.
(Haw. 2013) (effective Dec. 2, 2013); Illinois, S.B. 10, 98th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013)
(effective June 14, 2014); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 701 (2013); Maryland, Civil Marriage
Protection Act, H.B. 438, 430th Sess. (Md. 2012); Massachusetts, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (ruling that allowing only heterosexual couples to marry is
unconstitutional); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2013) (effective Aug. 1, 2013); New Hamp-
shire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2013) (effective Jan. 1, 2010); New Jersey, Garden State
Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J. 2013); New Mexico, Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013)
(affirming marriage equality in the state, which had never expressly prohibited or allowed same-sex
marriage); New York, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2013) (effective July 24, 2011);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 (2013) (effective Aug. 1, 2013); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 8 (2013-14) (amended 2009); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.10 (2013) (approved
2012).
In response to stagnant legislatures, voters began turning to referenda legalizing same-sex
marriage. State referenda passed by narrow margins on the November 2012 ballot in Maine (51.5%
approve Question 1), Maryland (52.4% approve Question 6), and Washington (53.7% approve
Referendum 74). Marriage and Family on the Ballot, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Marriage andfamily on the-ballot (last modified Mar. 25,
2014).
2014] ALL THAT HEA VEN WILL ALLOW 287
to the conundrum of how to respond to same-sex marriage allows for a
statistical analysis of how a state's mini-DOMA legislation may have
affected the culture of marriage and divorce in the United States." The
analysis is rather simple. Changes in marriage and divorce trends as well
as marriage rates and divorce rates are compared before and after an en-
actment of a mini- or super-DOMA, and changes in marriage and divorce
trends and rates are compared between states that enacted DOMAs and
those that permit same-sex marriage. But before arriving at that analysis,
it is important to identify whether DOMA states employed the same rea-
soning as Congress did when it enacted the federal DOMA.
A. Context Analysis
The first question that the research addresses is what reasons did
states pronounce as the basis for the need to enact a mini-DOMA through
statute or constitutional amendment? To answer this query, I analyzed
each state's legislative history, statutory language, and media content,
looking for themes surrounding the passage of mini-DOMA legislation.4 5
I also examined variations based on date of enactment, geographical lo-
cation, and whether a state passed a statute (a mini-DOMA) followed by
a constitutional amendment (a super-DOMA).46 I then compared the re-
sults with the reasons articulated in Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of
44. The theory behind the analysis is that while federal legislation may have some effect on a
state's cultural consciousness, a state's decision to enact a mini-DOMA would play a greater role in
expressing the cultural values and desires of that state's collective conscience and perhaps influence
marital behavior. Likewise, a state's close proximity to other states that have taken action may
influence state behavior. Some states respond in kind to a neighboring state, or one in close proximi-
ty. For example, Massachusetts's neighboring states-Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and
New York-followed suit in permitting same-sex marriage. Maine initially attempted to follow suit,
but a referendum quickly overturned the legislation. See An Act to End Discrimination in Civil
Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, L.D. 1020, 124th Me. St. Leg. (2009); Department of the
Sec'y of State, State of Me., November 3, 2009 General Election Tabulations, ME. BUREAU CORPS.,
ELECTIONS & COMMISSIONS, http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html
(last visited Apr. 12, 2014). Three years later, Maine voters approved same-sex marriage by approv-
ing Question 1. An Act to Allow Marriage Licenses for Same-Sex Couples and Protect Religious
Freedom, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 650 et seq. New Hampshire debated overturning its licensing
of same-sex marriage. H.B. 437, 162d Sess. (2011). That bill was voted down 211-116 on March 21,
2012. Michael K. Lavers, N.H. Lawmakers Reject Marriage Equality Repeal Bill, EDGE BOSTON,
MASSACHUSETS (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://www.edgeboston.com/news/national/news/131180/nhlawmakers reject marriage equalityr
epeal bill.
On the other hand, soon after Washington, D.C., permitted same-sex marriage, Maryland
followed suit by recognizing out-of-jurisdiction marriages. Mark Morgan, Editorial, Maryland's
Attorney General Strikes a Blow Against Discrimination with Opinion that Same-Sex Marriages
Legal Elsewhere Should Be Recognized, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 25, 2010, at 12A. Two years later,
Maryland would allow same-sex marriage with the Civil Marriage Act of 2012, but within months a
ballot referendum was certified for November to overturn the legislation. George P. Matysek, Jr.,
Leaders Pledge to Overturn Same-Sex Marriage, CATH. REV. (Feb. 23, 2012), available at
http://www.catholicreview.org/article/news/local-news/leaders-pledge-to-overtum-same-sex-
marriage.
45. See generally KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS
METHODOLOGY (2d ed. 2004); infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text.
46. See Pinello, supra note 38.
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Health and Human Services explaining the federal DOMA. 47 Specifical-
ly, the court observed that "[T]he Committee briefly discusses four of the
governmental interests advanced by this legislation: (1) defending and
nurturing the institution of traditional, heterosexual marriage; (2) defend-
ing traditional notions of morality; (3) protecting state sovereignty and
democratic self-governance; and (4) preserving scarce government re-
sources.',4
Three key themes emerge from the content analysis regarding moti-
vations for a state's DOMA passage. The first is that the long-held tradi-
tions and definition of marriage need protection to thrive.49 The second is
that children need to be protected and/or raised in an optimal environ-
ment.50 The third is that "activist"5' or "new age" 52 or "liberal" 53 judges
47. 682 F.3d 1, 9-15 (1st Cir. 2012).
48. Id. at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12 (1996)).
49. Many proponents fall back on this premise: loosening the definition of marriage will
cause the collapse of society. For example, Scott Moody, an economist, believes that "the devalua-
tion of marriage through same-sex marriage will eventually ensure a population in New Hampshire
where the shrinking, younger generation will no longer be able to support the state's economy."
Amanda Beland, Foster's Editorial Board: Economist Says Gay Marriage Undermines State 's
Fiscal Stability, FOSTER'S DAILY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 18, 2012, available at
http://www.fosters.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20120118/GJNEWS 01/701189932. But empir-
ical research to date on the effects of same-sex marriage suggests otherwise. See, e.g., M.V. LEE
BADGETr, WHEN GAY PEOPLE GET MARRIED: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SOCIETIES LEGALIZE SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE 202-06 (2009) (concluding, post-statistical analysis, that not much changes in heter-
osexual marriage and divorce behavior in societies that recognize same-sex marriage, and in fact,
attitudes about the irrelevancy of marriage have little to do with legalization of same-sex marriage).
The Williams Institute's research on the economic effects of permitting same-sex unions suggests an
economic boon to those states' economies. For example, Iowa added over half a million dollars in
additional tax revenue with the legalization of same-sex marriage in 2009. The Williams Inst., Ex-
tending Marriage Rights to Same-
Sex Couples in Iowa Boosted the State and Local Economy by $12 Million, UCLA SCH. L. (Dec. 7,
2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucia.edu/press/press-releases/marriage-rights-same-
sex-couples-iowa-boosted-economy/. While some "suggest[] we learn from history, saying every
single society who has weakened marriage or even eased divorce all came crumbling down," Consti-
tutional Amendment Re Marriage: Comm. Minutes on SJR 42 Before the S. Judiciary, 1997-98 Leg.
(Alaska Mar. 9, 1998) (statement of Tom Gordy, Chairman, Christian Coalition) [hereinaflter
Gordy], available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get-single-minute.asp?session=20&begline=O 139&end line=07
52&time=1335&date=19980309&comm=JUD&house=S, the research suggests that economic and
social policies are associated with the long term weakening of the family, not the introduction of
same-sex marriage. See, e.g., June Carbone, What Does Bristol Palin Have to Do with Same-Sex
Marriage?, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 317 (2010) (arguing that research demonstrates family instability
can be attributed to lack of economic opportunities, particularly based on social class); Holning Lau,
Would a Constitutional Amendment Protect and Promote Marriage in North Carolina? An Analysis
of Data from 2000 to 2009, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE Novo 173, 186 (2012) (arguing that mar-
riage amendments appear to have no effect on increasing marriage rates or decreasing divorces rates;
conversely, allowing same-sex marriage does not increase divorce rates nor decrease marriage rates).
50. A rich literature addresses this theme. Remarkably, most of the articles used to demon-
strate the allegedly damaging effects of same-sex parenting do not contain new empirical data, but
rather are summaries of the flaws of articles that suggest same-sex parenting does not harm children.
See generally MAGGIE GALLAGHER & JOSHUA K. BAKER, INST. FOR MARRIAGE AND PUB. POLICY,
Do MOTHERS AND FATHERS MATTER? THE SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE ON MARRIAGE AND CHILD
WELL-BEING, IMAPP POLICY BRIEF (Feb. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdflMothersFathersMatter.pdf (arguing that while same-sex parent-
age studies are scant, overwhelming evidence exists that children raised in a "natural" family made
up of opposite-sex biological parents fare far better than any other family form); ROBERT LERNER &
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ALTHEA K. NAGAI, MARRIAGE LAW PROJECT, No BASIS: WHAT THE STUDIES DON'T TELL US
ABOUT SAME-SEX PARENTING 3-10 (Jan. 2001), available at http://protectmarriage.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11 /nobasis.pdf (finding the research is too flawed to draw meaningful conclu-
sions); MARK MATOUSEK, THE BOY HE LEFT BEHIND: A MAN'S SEARCH FOR HIS LOST FATHER 24-
25 (2000) (used as support for the assertion that male children harmed when raised by lesbians);
KRISTIN ANDERSON MOORE ET AL., CHILD TRENDS, MARRIAGE FROM A CHILD'S PERSPECTIVE:
How DOES FAMILY STRUCTURE AFFECT CHILDREN, AND WHAT CAN WE Do ABOUT IT? (June
2002), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/MarriageRB602.pdf
(summarizing data and concluding two-parent biological households are best); MARY PARKE, CTR.
FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, ARE MARRIED PARENTS REALLY BETTER FOR CHILDREN? WHAT
RESEARCH SAYS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY STRUCTURE ON CHILD WELL-BEING (May 2003),
available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publicationsstates/files/0086.pdf, DAVID POPENOE,
LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE ARE
INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND SOCIETY 52-78 (1996) (children are harmed
when not raised in a household with one father and one mother); GLENN T. STANTON, FOCUS ON THE
FAMILY, ARE THE KIDS REALLY ALL RIGHT? WHAT RESEARCH REALLY SAYS ABOUT PARENTS
CHILDREN NEED (June 2010), available at http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about us/focus-
findings/parenting/are-the-kids-really-all-right.aspx (arguing that studies concluding that same-sex
parenting does not harm children are flawed). Diane Sawyer interviewed Rosie O'Donnell, who was
crusading to legalize homosexual adoption in Florida in 2002. During the interview, O'Donnell
"admitted that her adopted son, Parker, who was being raised by Rosie and her female partner, had
expressed a desire for a dad." Alysse ElHage, FAMILY N.C., Why Gender Matters to Parenting: All
Families Are Not Created Equal 3 (quoting the interview Primetime Thursday: Rosie O'Donnell, In
Her Own Words (ABC News television broadcast Mar. 14, 2002) (observing that many homosexual
activists disregard the child's desire for opposite-sex parents, dismissing them as childish whims,
societal pressures, or something to get over)), available at http://www.ncfamily.org/FNC/l 104Sl-
GenderMatters.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2014); Mark Regnerus, How Different Are the Adult Chil-
dren of Parents Who Have Same-Sex Relationships? Findings from the New Family Structures
Study, 41 SoC. SCL RES. 752 (2012) (concluding, among other things, that children who had a parent
who engaged in a same-sex relationship at some point in the child's life did not thrive as well as
children whose parents did not have such affairs). However, Regnerus's study received a firestorm
of criticism. William Saletan, Back in the Gay: Does a New Study Indict Gay Parenthood or Make a
Case for Gay Marriage?, SLATE (June II, 2012, 9:08 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health and science/human nature/2012/06/new familystructures st
udyis gayparenthood bad or is gay marriage good .html (pointing out the flawed classifica-
tion system, which ultimately reveals that broken homes, not gay parenting, harm children). The
Regnerus study received such a degree of criticism that the author was the subject of an inquiry at
the University of Texas. However, the university determined that no investigation was in order. Alan
Price, University of Texas at Austin Completes Inquiry into Allegations of Scientific Misconduct, U.
TEX. AUSTIN (Aug. 29, 2012),
http://www.utexas.edu/news/2012/08/29/regnerusscientific misconduct inquiry completed/.
51. See, for example, Florida. In 2008 voters passed Amendment 2 when proponents were
particularly concerned with recent judicial activism in Massachusetts and California usurping the
will of the people. Yes on 2: Fact Sheet, YES2MARRIAGE.ORG (2008), http://ccpcfl.orgNoter-
Guides/2008/2008MarriageAmend2.pdf ("[A]ctivist judges have re-written marriage laws and ig-
nored the will of the people by legalizing same[-]sex marriages."); Jennifer Mooney Piedra, Flori-
da's Amendment 2 Marriage Vote: Are Domestic Partners at Risk?, MIAMI HERALD,
http://miamiherald.typepad.com/gaysouthflorida/2008/1 0/floridas-amendm.html (voters worried
existing state law would be overturned by a judge). See also Alabama, where voters approved a June
2006 constitutional amendment by 81 % of the vote. Michael Foust, Ala. Becomes 20th State to Pass
Marriage Amendment, BAPTIST PRESS (June 7, 2006),
http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=23414 ("Judicial activism has put us in the posture of pre-
emptive strikes to build a firewall around the state of Alabama." (quoting Michael Ciamarra) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
52. See, for example, Kentucky Representative Sheldon Baugh who sponsored his state's
DOMA and said same-sex marriage "flies in the face of what's served mankind for 1,000 years." Jan
Garrett, The Debate over Same Sex Marriage: A Discussion of Martha Barnette's Letter (Oct. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript) (quoting PARK CITY DAILY NEWS (Mar. 21, 1998)) (internal quotation
marks omitted), available at http://www.wku.edu/-jan.garrett/ssm.htm. He also noted that "[i]f we
change that law, then what's to say we have to have an age limit, or not have multiple partners, or
(limit marriage) to human beings." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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from out of state should not control state laws regarding traditions. Cer-
tainly sub-themes emerge under each of these categories, but most re-
markable is the consistency of message over the last decade and a half
when states began enacting DOMA legislation and passing constitutional
amendments.
The central force behind protecting the definition of marriage is the
notion that marriage is central to the foundation of society. 54 Because
marriage is grounded in biblical origins,55 redefining it is to fly in the
face of religious liberty and morality. The second subtheme revolves
around institutional consequences.s7 If marriage is redefined around
53. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, Georgia Voters to Decide Gay-Marriage Issue in Fall, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at A14 ("We cannot let judges in Boston, or officials in San Francisco, define
marriage for the people of Georgia." (statement of Rep. Bill Hembree) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Lauretta Marigny, Letter to the Editor, Consider Gay Marriage Ramifications,
BISMARCK TRIB. (July 5, 2004, 7:00 PM), available at
http://bismarcktribune.com/news/opinion/mailbag/consider-gay-mariage-
ramifications/article 0986ab8a-520c-550a-86f7-d8a77f5a72f9.html (explaining that senators are
reluctant to support a federal marriage amendment because "one ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court
could make same-sex marriages legal in all 50 states").
54. See Gordy, supra note 49; Jeremy Jay Greenup, Identity as Politics, Politics as Identity:
An Anthropological Examination of the Political Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage 39-42 (Jan. 12,
2006) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgia State University), available at
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/anthro theses/10/.
55. E.g., BILL BRADBURY, OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, VOTERS' PAMPHLET: STATE OF OREGON
GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 2, 2004, at 80 (2004) [hereinafter OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET],
available at http://oregonvotes.org/doc/history/nov22004/guide/vpvoll.pdf (citing to God's creation
of the institution of marriage, "God's purpose," and Biblical citation to Romans 1:18-32). However,
note that that Jeff Brown, a Georgia State Representative, voted for DOMA because he believed that
the historical and biblical definition of marriage is under attack. He argued for a federal constitution-
al amendment that would better stymie activist judges. Press Release, Jeff Brown, Ga. House of
Representatives, Defense of Marriage (Feb. 27, 2004) (on file with author) (admitting he "would be
remis[s] if [he] didn't admit that a major erosion of the institution of marriage is due to nearly 50%
of heterosexual couples" who divorce).
56. Some evolution has occurred in the use of religious or moral discourse. Initially, the
discourse focused on the immorality of homosexuality. However, as that argument appears to lose
traction over time as public opinion sways favorably towards same-sex marriage, opponents of
same-sex marriage have successfully adopted the religious freedom argument, which has been an
effective discourse tool in other arenas. See, e.g., Seth Forman, Op-Ed., Five Arguments Against Gay
Marriage: Society Must Brace for Corrosive Change, DAILY NEws (June 23, 2011, 4:00 AM),
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-06-23/news/2971073 1 _gay-marriage-traditional-marriage-
gay-advocates (explaining that proponents of the sanctity of traditional marriage must face the risk
that they may be seen by future generations in the same light as those who opposed desegregation);
see also Tovia Smith, Same-Sex Marriage May Hinge on Supreme Court, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Jan.
24, 2012, 4:12 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/24/145473719/same-sex-marriage-may-hinge-on-
supreme-court. See generally OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supra note 55 (demonstrating that some
supporters of Measure 36 argued that Oregon should not be the only place in America that allows
gay marriage).
57. See Marigny, supra note 53 (arguing that same-sex marriage will cause health insurance
costs to skyrocket because of new dependents that would be added, which could overburden the
system). According to opponents of same-sex marriage, one consequence of same-sex marriage is
the societal cost of sending a message that heterosexual parents are irrelevant. "'It's the societal
message that same-sex marriage sends-that children do not need a mother and a father,' says Kevin
Smith, executive director of New Hampshire's Cornerstone Policy Research." Kathryn Perry, The
Cost of Gay Marriage-In Dollars and Cents, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 27, 2009),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2009/0527/p02s07-usse.html. See generally OREGON
VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supra note 55 (relaying that many opponents of same-sex marriage argued that
it would negatively affect institutions and societal values).
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something other than heterogeneous norms, the institution will weaken,
creating social instability.5 8 In essence, the "family" in its idealized ver-
sion must be preserved through heterosexual marriage.59 Implicit in this
concern is the fear that, if unchecked, homosexuality will spread.0
With respect to marriage and children, the most consistent refrain is
that marriage creates the optimal environment in which to raise chil-
dren.6 1 Research is sometimes cited that concludes that the outcomes for
children are most favorable for offspring raised in a two-parent (oppo-
site-sex, biological) household.62 Courts and legislatures have adopted
this premise and call it a legitimate government interest.63 However, the
sub-contextual inference is that children need protection from homosexu-
al parents.64 Therefore, the concern is not about providing children with
an optimal environment per se, but rather that children will be harmed if
two people of the same-sex raise them. Again, research is said to demon-
strate that children nurtured in same-sex households experience negative
consequences compared with children living in married, heterosexual
58. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113(a) (2013) (effective 1996) ("Tennessee's mar-
riage licensing laws reinforce, carry forward, and make explicit the long-standing public policy of
this state to recognize the family as essential to social and economic order and the common good and
as the fundamental building block of our society.").
59. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (discussing Congress's desire
to preserve the notions of traditional heterosexual marriage and family). Gay marriage will likely
change. the notion of traditional marriage. Forman, supra note 56 ("[E]ven gay activists admit they
are seeking to change the marriage ideal. . . . It may be old-fashioned to believe women are still
necessary to domesticate sexually predatory men. But most social arrangements in which men oper-
ate without attachment to women are deeply dysfunctional."). Voter pamphlets contain different
flavors of this same point. "For marriage to flourish in our culture, it must be protected from re-
definition; for if marriage can mean anything, it will mean nothing." South Carolina Marriage
Amendment, No SAME SEX MARRIAGE, http://nosamesexmarriage.com/marriage/SCmarr.php (last
visited Apr. 12, 2014). And it takes a mother and a father to raise healthy children. Id.; see also
OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supra note 55, at 79 (needing to protect traditional marriage because
marriage is a "building block" of society).
60. Marigny, supra note 53 (threatening a significant increase in the percentage of American
culture to identify as homosexual).
61. OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET, supra note 55, at 81 (arguing that the breakdown of mar-
riage hurts children, that same-sex marriage challenges the notion of gender roles within the family,
and that changing the importance of gender and the family would be bad). See also Lofton v. Sec'y
of Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815-20 (holding that though 'exemplary' gay
foster parents formed a 'deeply loving,' and 'interdependent' relationship with their foster children,
they held no constitutional right to adoption as a same-sex family structure was not an 'optimal'
placement).
62. See sources cited supra note 50.
63. "[C]ountless statistics and research attest to the fact that when marriage becomes less
important because it is expanded beyond its traditional definition to include other arrangements, that
untoward consequences such as greater out-of-wedlock births occur." Brief for Intervenor-Appellant
at 53, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-
2204, 10-2207, 10-2214) (alteration in original) (quoting 150 Cong. Rec. 15074 (2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (statement of Sen. Cornyn).
64. The American College of Pediatricians disagrees with the district court's assertion that "a
consensus has developed among the medical, psychological, and social welfare communities that
children raised by gay and lesbian parents are just as likely to be well-adjusted as those raised by
heterosexual parents." Brief of Amicus Curiae, American College of Pediatricians in Support of
Defendants-Appellants at 2, Massachusetts, 682 F.3d I (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214) (quoting
Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (D. Mass. 2010)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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households.6 5 This harming-the-child theme goes further, though. The
reasoning goes that children exposed to gay parents may come to think
that homosexuality is normal. Second, children may be forced to learn
about it in school. 66 Finally, children may experiment with homosexuali-
ty and become homosexuals themselves.6 7
A final recurrent strain has to do with fear of activist judges. States
started adopting DOMAs in two main waves. The first wave was a re-
sponse to the Supreme Court of Hawaii's 1993 decision 68 that led to a
surge of challenges to the practice of barring same-sex marriage. 69 The
second wave came in reaction to, Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court decision in 2003.70 The states expressed deep concern that judges,
not citizens, would define foundational cultural norms surrounding mar-
65. See supra note 50; see, e.g., Forman, supra note 56 ("[C]hildren living in gay homes ...
live[] absent a relationship with at least one biological parent."). In fact, much debate arises around
this question. The First Circuit chose not to engage in resolving this dispute from a legal standpoint
because, as the court observed, same-sex couples are free to create families whether they are married
or not. U.S. Dep 't of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 14; see also Pedersen v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 340-41 (D. Conn. 2012) (noting that "DOMA bears no rational rela-
tionship to the purported goal of ensuring that children are reared by opposite-sex parents" because
DOMA cannot prevent same-sex couples from raising children (citing US. Dept of Health and
Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 14)).
66. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 56 (fearing that courts will impose a duty on schools to
teach moral equivalency between homosexual and heterosexual relationships with no obligation to
let parents opt out); Marigny, supra note 53 ("Textbooks will be required to show families with two
mothers or fathers as they now depict the traditional family."). Similarly, proponents of Montana's
CI-96 (DOMA Amendment) proclaim, "[W]e could lose the freedom to teach our children as we
wish." BOB BROWN, MONT. SEC'Y OF STATE, 2004 VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET 23 (2004),
available at http://sos.mt.gov/elections/archives/2000s/2004/IP2004.pdf; see also Dara Kam, If
Amendment 2 Fails, Backers Say Kids Will Be Led in 'Gay Lifestyle,' PALM BEACH POST (Oct. 22,
2008), available at
http://pridetb.homestead.com/IOlfAmendment2FailsBackersSayKidsWillBeLedInGayLifestylel0-
22-08PBPost.htm ("Failing to ban gay marriage in the state constitution could result in the indoctri-
nation of schoolchildren into a gay lifestyle."); LA Schools to Teach LGBT Curriculum in Anti-
Bullying Effort, CBS L.A. (Sept. 14, 2011, 10:56 PM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2011/09/14/la-
schools-to-teach-lgbt-curriculum-in-anti-bullying-effort/ ("Students in the Los Angeles Unified
school district may soon be taught 'age-appropriate' curriculum promoting positive images of homo-
sexuals and their contributions to society.").
67. E g., Marigny, supra note 53 ("If we stamp the lifestyle with approval by sanctioning
same-sex marriage, many more young people will be experimenting with homosexuality and end up
as part of that subculture.").
68. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993).
69. E.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d at 6 & nn.1-2.
70. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the
state may not "deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two
individuals of the same sex who wish to many"). Many states responded to the Massachusetts deci-
sion by enacting mini-DOMA constitutional amendments in 2004, including Arkansas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Utah. State Policies on Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RES. CENTER (July 9, 2009),
http://www.pewforum.org/2009/07/09/state-policies-on-same-sex-marriage/. Likewise, in 2005,
Kansas and Texas followed suit with their own amendments. Id. In 2006, Alabama, Colorado, Idaho,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin enacted amendments. Id. Arizo-
na, California, and Florida passed amendments in 2008. Id. In May 2012, North Carolina approved
its own constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. Campbell Robertson, Ban on Gay Mar-
riage Passes in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, at Al 5.
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riage.71 Judges could easily rely on little understood, seemingly esoteric
legal principles to destroy a centuries-old foundational institution that
goes to the root of civilization.
These concerns varied in intensity depending on geographical loca-
tion. For example, some citizens in Southern states may be more likely to
express the desired goals using language that, at times, comes across as
homophobic. 72 Moreover, this same geographical area includes some
individuals who may rely on the discourse of "God's law" as the overrid-
ing principle for defining marriage.73 Finally, a fascinating articulation of
the need for marriage occurred in North Carolina,74 (but the same may
also hold true for South Carolina)75 where heterosexual marriage fuic-
71. See supra notes 51-53 (discussing judges as "activists," "new age," and "liberal"); Brian
Tashman, Conservatives Decry 'Bizarre' Ruling Finding DOMA Unconstitutional, Lament 'East
Coast Liberal Freak Show,' RIGHT WING WATCH (May 31, 2012, 4:11 PM),
http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/conservatives-decry-bizarre-ruling-doma-unconstitutional.
For example, proponents of Michigan Proposal 04-2 to ban same-sex marriage "believe that amend-
ing the [state] Constitution is necessary to avert a judicial interpretation of law allowing same-sex
marriage, as occurred last year in Massachusetts." PATRICK AFFHOLTER, SENATE FISCAL AGENCY,
NOVEMBER 2004 BALLOT PROPOSAL 04-2, at 3 (2004), available at
http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/publications%5Cballotprops%5CproposalO4-2.pdf Further-
more, in 2010, Iowa voters removed three Iowa Supreme Court Justices who voted to allow same-
sex marriage in the state. Peter Hardin, In Iowa, Threats to Impeach Judges Are Renewed, GAVEL
GRAB (June 14, 2012), http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=37494.
72. Two principal traditionalist arguments against same-sex marriage are the polygamy slip-
pery-slope and the contagious-promiscuity arguments. The first is epitomized by Texas Rep. Warren
Chisum. He said, "It's important not to enter into a social experiment that would change the defini-
tion of family. There's a short step from homosexual marriage to polygamy." Sandra Zaragoza,
Business Wary over Prop 2, DALLAS BUS. J. (Oct. 23, 2005, 23:00 CDT) (intemal quotation marks
omitted), http://www.bizjoumals.com/dallas/stories/2005/10/ 2 4 /storyl.html?page=all. The second
suggests that gay men are more promiscuous than lesbians and straight individuals. Gay male cou-
ples will, therefore, be more promiscuous than other couples. As a result, the non-monogamous
behavior of gay male couples will, by notorious example, weaken the monogamous commitment of
married heterosexual couples, which will eventually destabilize traditional marriage. Dale Carpenter,
The Traditionalist Case-The Contagious-Promiscuity Argument, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 2,
2005, 4:43 PM), http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive 2005 10 30-
200511 05.shtml#l 130971386; see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (2013) (effective 1997)
(Mississippi codified marriage between persons of the same gender as void under a section titled
"Incestuous Marriages Void"). Cf WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1998) (titling the section "Mar-
riage Contract -Void Marriages").
73. See Press Release, supra note 55. Similarly, Harold Auxier, a Kentucky voter, said, "It's
God's law that woman was made for man and man for woman-not man for man and woman for
woman." Kentucky Voters Approve Same-Sex Marriage Ban Amendment, USA TODAY (Nov. 3,
2004, 2:26 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2004/2004-11-02-ky-
initiative-gay-marriage x.htm.
74. Alliance Defense Fund claims that a DOMA amendment in North Carolina will help
encourage a decline in domestic violence in the state. Brian Tashman, ADF: 'North Carolina Mar-
riage Amendment Will Help Promote' the Decline ofDomestic Violence, RIGHT WING WATCH (May
8, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/adf-north-carolina-amendment-one-
domestic-violence.
75. In fact, it turns out South Carolina's women may be in need of protection too. In the past
ten years, South Carolina has ranked in the top ten states for the highest rate of women murdered by
men. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2011 HOMICIDE
DATA 5, 18 (2013) [hereinafter 2011 HOMICIDE DATA], available at
http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw20l3.pdf. In 2009, South Carolina ranked 7th in the United States
for female homicides by male offenders with 90% of the women murdered by someone they knew.
VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 HOMICIDE DATA 22
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tions as a way to contain male aggression and sexuality. Thus, not only
children, but also women find protection through marriage.
The cultural framing around the need for DOMAs is significant in
the urgency expressed regarding the integrity of the family and the role
homosexuality appears to play in threatening the ideal notion of the fami-
ly. Part II of this Article discusses this point in more detail. Regardless of
how the states express their DOMA goals, these goals mirror the goals
stated in Massachusetts76 and in the petitioner's brief in Windsor.7 ' Thus,
the assertion that passage of these statutes and amendments is associated
with the articulated, desired goals demands interrogation.
B. Analysis of State DOMAs
This next section considers whether states' passage of a DOMA
statute, a constitutional amendment, or both, correlated with the goal of
strengthening marriage compared with states that did not enact such leg-
islation.78 In other words, did DOMAs increase marriage and decrease
divorce over time in states that enacted the legislation compared with
states that shunned DOMAs? 79
To examine this correlation, I operationalized the goal of family
stability/marital strength by measuring the year-over-year marriage and
divorce rates from 1999 through 2010.80 The slope, or average rate of
change, is calculated for the years prior to adoption of a state's DOMA
(2011), http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw201 I.pdf. In 2010, South Carolina ranked 2nd for homi-
cides committed against females. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN
ANALYSIS OF 2010 HOMICIDE DATA 6, 17 (2012), http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw20l2.pdf. In
2011, South Carolina ranked first in the nation. 2011 HOMICIDE DATA, supra, at 15. Indeed, "South
Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson identified domestic violence as the number one crime issue
in the state. According to the State Attorney General's website, more than 36,000 victims report a
domestic violence incident to law enforcement statewide." Anomaly, Domestic Violence Is the
Number One Crime Issue in S.C., Nikki Haley Vetoes Funding, Calls It a "Distraction,"
FREAKOUTNATION (July 10, 2012), available at http://freakoutnation.com/2012/07/10/domestic-
violence-is-the-number-one-crime-issue-in-s-c-nikki-haley-vetoes-funding-calls-it-a-distraction/.
76. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir.
2012).
77. Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, Windsor v. United States, No. 12-63,
2012 WL 2904038 (July 16, 2012).
78. One study examined the negative externalities, or effect, on the institution of heterosexual
marriage in states that allowed same-sex marriage with the effects on those states that did not, find-
ing no statistically significant difference in outcomes. Laura Langbein & Mark A. Yost, Jr., Same-
Sex Marriage and Negative Externalities, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 292, 293 (2009). However, this study has
been criticized because of operationalization errors, coding errors, and statistical power errors.
Douglas W. Allen, Let's Slow Down: Comments on Same-Sex Marriage and Negative Externalities
(Dec. 9, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1722764.
79. This analysis is based on the state of the law at the time for which the data was collected:
1999-2010.
80. These years are used because they represent the decade in which the vast majority of
DOMA amendments passed. The end year, 2010, is the most recent year for which data is available.
The start year, 1999, is the first year for which continuous year-over-year data is available.
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amendment and the years after the passage of the DOMA amendment for
both marriage and divorce.81
The key independent variable in the study was whether a state had
amended its constitution to define marriage as between a man and a
woman, i.e., to ban same-sex marriage. 82 States that had enacted both a
statute banning same-sex marriage and a constitutional amendment to the
same effect or states that had passed a constitutional amendment, but did
not enact a statute" during the time for which marriage and divorce rates
were available were included in this category and coded as "0."8 Under
the rationale behind DOMA, the institution of marriage would be least
vulnerable in these states because its citizenry has clarified the definition
of marriage in its constitution-clearly expressing the state's values re-
garding this bedrock social structure.
On the other hand, states that did not have a constitutional amend-
ment at the time that I collected the data, but rather had enacted a statute
banning same-sex marriage during the period in question86 were included
as a separate category coded as "1.,87 These states' marital vulnerability
might be considered slightly higher under the DOMA rationale because
these statutes were open to constitutional challenges. Thus, the citizenry
81. "Slope" is the statistical term that refers to the average rate of change for the period of
years measured and analyzed. It is the central measurement of a trend model. LINDA L. REMY ET AL.,
UCSF FAMILY HEALTH OUTCOMES PROJECT, Do WE HAVE A LINEAR TREND? A BEGINNER'S
APPROACH TO ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN COMMUNITY HEALTH INDICATORS 3 (2005), available at
http://familymedicine.medschool.ucsf.edu/fhop/docs/pdf/mcah/trendl3b.pdf.
82. Recall that a state constitutional amendment defining marriage in this way is termed a
"super-DOMA." See supra note 38 and text accompanying note 46.
83. Four states-California, Nebraska, Nevada, and Oregon-responded to either the Hawaii
Supreme Court decision or the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision by directly amending their
constitutions. See supra note 39.
84. For example, California passed its amendment in 2008. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (2008).
However, a federal district court ruled that it was unconstitutional in 2010. Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Thus, for purposes of this analysis, California is treated as
having a super-DOMA. The challenge in categorizing states with evolving legislation or legal prece-
dent is determining how long the state held a particular status such that the citizenry would have
time to experience a cultural shift in light of the legal changes to marriage definitions.
85. Recall that marriage was open to attack if procreation was perceived as acceptable outside
of marriage or open to interpretation by judges. See supra notes 51-53 and 70.
86. Two states fall into this category: Washington and Maryland. The Washington State
Legislature overturned its 1998 statute banning gay marriage by enacting a statute permitting same-
sex marriage in early February 2012. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (2013); S.B. 6239, 62d Leg.,
2012 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdoes/201I-
12/PdflBills/Senate%2OBills/6239.pdf. The law was to take effect June 7th, 2012, but the decision
was stayed by Referendum 74 on the November 6, 2012, ballot. Proposed Referendum Measures-
2012, WASH. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/referendum.aspx?y-2012
(last visited Apr. 13, 2014). Therefore, Washington State is included in the statutory-ban group for
purposes of this analysis. Maryland is similarly situated for this analysis. See H.B. 438, 2012 Leg.,
430th Sess. (Md. 2012); 2012 General Election Ballot Questions, MD. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS,
Question 6, http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/ballot questions.htmi (last visited Apr.
13, 2014). For information on the state of the law in these jurisdictions as of February 5, 2014, see
supra note 39.
87. Recall that a statute banning same-sex marriage is referred to as a mini-DOMA. See supra
note 38 and the text accompanying note 46.
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may not have had rock-solid confidence around the meaning of marriage
as an institution in these states because "activist" judges could have over-
turned the statutory definition, resulting in a more fluid definition of mar-
riage.
Finally, those states that had no statute or amendment banning
same-sex marriage were coded as "2." This coding structure allowed me
to hypothesize that the institution of marriage, according to the DOMA
rationale, would be weakest and most vulnerable to attack in these states.
The citizenry either had not collectively expressed a codified position
regarding the definition of marriage, or it had determined that a broader
definition of marriage, which includes same-sex couples, is appropri-
ate-again at the time that I collected the data.
The analysis incorporated a number of control variables. Variables
known to affect marital stability are: median age of first marriage, per-
cent of state's population with a bachelor's degree, median disposable
income, and percent of population living below the poverty line. 89 Four
other variables were included in the analysis because they are likely to
influence a state's view of marriage or to reflect the current state of mari-
tal stability there: percent of males and percent of females married three
or more times; percent of population who view religion as an important
part of daily life; percent of single-parent households; and the conserva-
tive-advantage points 90 over liberals in the state.91 Finally, the variable of
state recognition of alternative legal relationships (i.e. domestic partner-
ships) was added to the analysis. 92 Other variables initially included in
the analysis were foreclosure rates and unemployment rates. However, in
this study, these variables appeared to have no effect on the marriage and
divorce trends.93
88. See supra note 51.
89. See generally NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010).
90. "Conservative-advantage points" refers to the number of conservative voters greater than
the number of liberal voters in a state. For example, if a state had 45% conservative voters and 30%
liberal voters, the conservative advantage would be 15 points.
91. Data for these variables were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, with exception of
religiosity and conservative-advantage points, which came from Gallup polls. American Community
Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU http://www.census.gov/acs/www/data documentation/data-main/
(last visited May 21, 2014); Frank Newport, State of the States. Importance of Religion, GALLUP
(Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 114022/state-states-importance-religion.aspx#1 (religi-
osity); State of the States, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 25066/State-
States.aspx?ref-interactive (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (interactive map, select "Conservative ad-
vantage" metric).
92. The state of the law involving same-sex marriage is constantly evolving. Thus, the data
relied on the state of the law between 1999-2010. Much has changed since then. For example, some
states, like Washington, did not permit same-sex marriage at the time of this analysis, but provided
rights very similar to marital rights through domestic partnerships. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE §
35.21.980 (2009). See generally supra note 42 (enumerating states offering comparable rights).
Other states allow for similar rights by providing for civil unions. Supra note 40.
93. These results are consistent with the other analysis addressing the statistical link between
economy and divorce. Philip N. Cohen, Recession and Divorce in the United States, 2008-201I
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1. Results
The first hypothesis is that those states that have both constitutional
amendments and statutes, or just constitutional amendments, would be
associated with the greatest decline in divorce rates. 94 Following this
logic, by comparison, those states that had just a DOMA statute might
not experience as radical a decline in their divorce rates. Finally, those
states without a DOMA statute or amendment would have likely had the
lowest decline in divorce.9 5 The same hypothesis applies for patterns of
marriage but in the converse. In DOMA-amendment or amendment-plus-
statute states, one might expect to see the greatest increases in marriage
rates, followed by lesser increases in DOMA-statute or no-DOMA states.
(Md. Population Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 008, 2014), available at
http://papers.ccpr.ucia.edu/papers/PWP-MPRC-2012-008/PWP-MPRC-2012-008.pdf (concluding
that unemployment rates had no effect on the odds of divorce, and while foreclosure rates were
positively associated with divorce, the correlation was not statistically significant); see also Jeff
Grabmeier, Marital Separations an Alternative to Divorce for Poor Couples, OHIO ST. U. RES.
NEWS (Aug. 13, 2012), http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/maritalsep.htm (concluding that other
factors-such as a racial or ethnic minority status, family income, family education, and the pres-
ence of young children-are predictive of long-term separation). But, the public discussion emerging
from media suggests that the economy is a substantial cause for declines in divorce rates. Lisa Bel-
kin, Postponing Divorce in a Down Market, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE (Mar. 23, 2010, 10:47 AM),
http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/postponing-divorce-in-a-down-market (discussing
the affordability of divorce and how hardships imposed by excessive debt may postpone separation);
Carol Mithers, What to Do When You Can't Afford a Divorce, 0, OPRAH MAG. (May 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.oprah.com/relationships/What-to-Do-When-You-Cant-Afford-a-Divorce.
94. States with both constitutional amendments and statutes banning same-sex marriage at the
time of this study were Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, and Virginia. States with a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage at the
time of this study, but having no matching statute, were Oregon and Wisconsin. See, e.g., OR. REV.
STAT. § 106.010 (enacted 1975) (defining marriage as "a civil contract entered into in person by
males at least 17 years of age and females at least 17 years of age"). But see OR. REV. STAT. §
106.020 (enacted 1989) (prohibiting certain marriages but not expressly prohibiting same-sex mar-
riages). States with statutes banning same-sex marriage at the time of this study, but with no consti-
tutional provisions, were Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, West Virgin-
ia, Wyoming, Maryland, and Washington. The Maryland and Washington legislatures passed bills in
February 2012 permitting same-sex marriage, but the legislation was stayed pending referendums in
November in both states. See supra note 86. States that did not ban same-sex marriage by either
statute or constitutional amendment at the time of this study were New York, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and New Mexico. New
Jersey's governor, Governor Christie, vetoed the February 2012 same-sex marriage bill, and the
matter was stayed pending a public referendum on the November 2012 ballot. Kate Zernike, Christie
Keeps His Promise to Veto Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, at A 19. New Mexico law
made no mention of same-sex marriage at the time of this study. New Mexico, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/entry/c/new-mexico (last visited June 12, 2014) ("New Mexi-
co's laws do not explicitly allow or prohibit marriage for same-sex couples."). In 2007, 2008, and
2010, New Mexico state legislators introduced bills to allow same-sex marriage. Id. Each was either
defeated or died. Id. Alternatively, in 2008, a bill was introduced to prohibit same-sex marriage, but
it failed as well. The District of Columbia also did not have laws banning same-sex marriage at the
time of this study. See note 39 for the state of the law as of February 5, 2014.
95. To create a meaningful "before" and "after" comparison to the states that enacted consti-
tutional amendments, states with or without a statute had their marriage and divorce trends grouped
between 1999-2004 and 2005-2010.
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To engage in this analysis, I conducted four separate statistical ex-
aminations. The first series looked at a comparison in the trends of mar-
riage before and after DOMA enactment for the group of states that
passed a DOMA amendment compared with those that did not.9 6 The
next analysis explored the average marriage rates in the years before and
after DOMA passage for both groups of states.97 The third examination
of data explored any statistically significant differences that may have
emerged in the divorce trends for either group of states. An exploration
of any statistically significant differences in the average divorce rates in
the years prior to and after DOMA ratification between the DOMA and
non-DOMA states concluded the analysis. At this point in the Article, it
is important to note that during the years captured for the analysis, re-
gardless of the state, both marriage and divorce rates were on the decline
everywhere.9 8 The question becomes: by how much?
To begin, I calculated the slopes for each state. 99 Next, I conducted
a paired-samples-means-t-test analysisl" using the Statistical Package
for the Social Sciences (SPSS). This analysis revealed whether a statisti-
cally significant difference for the average decline in marriage and di-
vorce trends marked the two time periods. The first period captures the
years before the enactment of the amendments for both the DOMA and
non-DOMA states, 01 and the second period captures the years after the
passage of DOMA amendments regardless of whether the states enacted
an amendment. The results showed that, for either category of state, the
96. Trend analysis provides the most accurate measure of change in marriage or divorce in a
particular state or group of states. However, it does not reveal the number of people in the state that
engage in the behavior.
97. Rates provide standardized measurements of divorce or marriage in a particular state or
group of states based on a population unit over a given period of time. Rates measure how much of a
state's population engages in the particular behavior.
98. National Vital Statistics System: National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage divorce_tables.htm
(last visited June 12, 2014).
99. Alaska and Nebraska are excluded from both the marriage and divorce analysis because
they enacted amendments in 1998 and 2000, respectively. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (approved
1998); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (adopted 2000). Thus, the data available do not allow for meaningful
review of trends in those states. Further, Oklahoma does not have marriage and divorce data availa-
ble prior to 2004, so it is not included in the marriage trends. Likewise, California has no divorce
data available; Georgia has no divorce data after 2003; Hawaii only provided divorce data through
2002; Indiana has no divorce data; Louisiana has virtually no divorce data available; and Minnesota
has no divorce data after 2004. Therefore, these states are excluded or partially excluded from the
analysis. Each state's slope was analyzed for linearity. The following states revealed curvilinear
trends: Washington D.C., Massachusetts, and Montana. By curvilinear, we mean that the trends do
not follow a straight path consistently increasing or decreasing over time. Instead, the data shows
trends that are more circular in which the rates increase and decrease unevenly.
100. A paired-sample t-test is used in "before-after" studies, comparing the population means
of two correlated samples to determine whether a significant difference exists between the average
values of the same measurement taken under two varying conditions. See, e.g., FREDERICK J.
GRAVETTER & LARRY B. WALLNAU, STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 353-56 (8th ed.
2009).
101. Recall that the non-DOMA states' marriage and divorce trends are divided similarly to the
time trends in the DOMA states in order for the former states to act as a control-or as a comparison
group-with the DOMA states. See supra note 95.
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marriage rate consistently declined throughout the pre- and post-
amendment time periods. Moreover, the average difference in decline
before and after an amendment passage was not statistically signifi-
cant.102
Another way of considering this outcome is to look at the average
rate of marriage for the time before and after the amendments' pas-
sage. 03 The mean rate of marriage gives a sense of how many people
were likely to marry in a particular type of state-either a DOMA or
non-DOMA state for our purposes. Prior to the passage of DOMA
amendments, the average marriage rate in DOMA states was 7.83 per
1000 people.1m In non-DOMA states, the rate was 8.67 per 1000 people.
Even though the rate of marriage declined for both groups after a DOMA
amendment enactment, the average marriage rate remained lower in
DOMA states than in non-DOMA states. In DOMA states, the marriage
rate was 6.96 per 1000 people compared to 7.93 per 1000 people in non-
DOMA states. These different average rates, though quite small, were
statistically significant for both pre- and post-DOMA ratification.
Thus, two important points emerge. First, the data analysis reveals
that non-DOMA states included a population of individuals who, on av-
erage, are slightly more likely to marry than their counterparts in DOMA
states. Second, the trend of declining marriage was present in both cate-
gories of states, but it was not statistically significant from the trend prior
102. Statistical significance is an assessment indicating the likelihood that the results obtained
reflect a pattern or occurred due to chance. See, e.g., JEREMY MILES & PHILIP BANYARD,
UNDERSTANDING AND USING STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY: A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION 86-88
(2007). Statistical significance most likely did not emerge for the pre- and post-DOMA enactment
for either of these groups of states because the trend was consistently downward for the ten-year
period measured. No major historical events occurred that have had measurable effects on the states
as groups. Although one would have expected that the Great Recession would have affected mar-
riage and divorce trends, it does not appear to have done so. See Cohen, supra note 93. However, an
individualized analysis of each state reveals that certain states, with the passage of laws that permit
same-sex marriage, experience a sharp uptick in their marriage rates. However, this new marriage
rate does not sustain itself. The question of whether this uptick affects divorce rates remains an open
question. A five-year delay between marriage and divorce trends is expected given the mean number
of years (five) that must pass before a marriage is likely to end in divorce. Steve Doughty, The Five-
Year Itch: Crisis Point for the Modern Marriage Is Arriving Sooner, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Oct. 29,
2007, at 25 (discussing a study by the Max Planck Institute). Massachusetts is the one state that does
provide enough data for a preliminary examination. Indeed, the results show that after a consistent
(and low) divorce rate in the time period between 2004 and 2009, a sharp increase in the divorce rate
began in 2010-five years after the steep hike in marriage rates. See Appendix A.
103. The average rate does not measure the change or trend year over year, but rather defines
the average number of people per one thousand people in the population who married in the state
during a particular time period.
104. Nevada is excluded from the mean marriage-rate analysis because it is a significant outlier
that disproportionately increases the marriage rate for DOMA states. Please note that the data pre-
sented in the charts is for the different permutations of DOMA options. However, the data discussed
in the text combines the DOMA statute-only states with non-DOMA states in order to isolate the
states with constitutional amendments and compare them to states that did not respond so definitive-
ly to banning same-sex marriage. The idea was also to create sample sizes that might create enough
statistical power to find statistical significance.
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to the passage of DOMA amendments. 05 In other words, people in the
United States, generally, were increasingly less likely to get married dur-
ing the time that the analysis was conducted regardless of whether a giv-
en state had a DOMA amendment.'
TABLE ONE
MARRIAGE RATES AND TRENDS FOR DOMA AND NON-DOMA STATES
Rate/1000 in the pop Avg. Decline
n
Pre Post Pre Post
DOMA amend-
ment and statute 8.50 7.59 -0.358 -0.256 26
DOMA statute
only 13.13 10.58 -0.053 -0.223 12
No DOMA 7.01 6.46 -0.076 -0.134 7
On the other hand, the divorce-rate trend also declined for both
groups, but the average rate of decline in the time period before DOMA
versus the time period after DOMA is statistically significant for both
groups. In other words, both groups experienced a lesser decline in di-
vorce rates in the years after the political discourse and enactments of
DOMA amendments. Thus, regardless of whether or not a state enacted
an amendment or a statute barring same-sex marriage, fewer of its citi-
zens chose to divorce. However, the reduced decline can most likely be
attributed to fewer marriages occurring during this same time period.107
Adding context to this trend data, the mean divorce rates for the
DOMA and non-DOMA states reveal that the mean rate of divorce was
slightly lower after the passage of DOMA for both groups. However,
these differences are not statistically significant from the average rates of
divorce for either group prior to DOMAs' passages. Nonetheless, on
average, citizens of non-DOMA states tend to get divorced less than in-
dividuals living in states that have DOMA amendments. Specifically,
prior to DOMA's passage, the average rate of divorce in DOMA states
was 4.1 compared to 3.72 in non-DOMA states. After the enactment of
105. These points are important in exploring why DOMA could not solve the perceived issue
of declining marriage rates. The next section offers an explanation of why DOMA is irrelevant to
shoring up the institution of marriage, particularly for those states that do possess legislation barring
same-sex marriage. See infra Part II.
106. Data on national divorce rates is still only available through 2010. Marriage and Divorce,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm
(last updated Nov. 21, 2013).
107. Note the lower mean rate of marriage during this period. See supra Table 1.
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DOMA amendments, the average divorce rate dropped to 3.78 in DOMA
states and 3.34 in non-DOMA states. Thus, one can conclude that, while
less divorce occurs in non-DOMA states, both types of states experi-
enced a statistically significant rate of change in divorce after the passage
of DOMA regardless of whether the state has the amendment. Simply
put, the decline in divorce slowed in the years after DOMA for both
types of states, and an incredibly small difference in divorce rates existed
between the two types of states.
TABLE Two
DIVORCE RATES AND TRENDS FOR DOMA AND NON-DOMA STATES
Rate/1OO pop. Avg. Decline
*Statistically significant at p=0.05
The more compelling question, though, was whether the mean dif-
ference in the trend of decline for divorce and marriage in the two time
periods, pre- and post-DOMA amendment passage, was statistically dif-
ferent between the two groups of states: those that enacted an amendment
or statute, and those that did not. The next analysis sought to identify
whether states that passed DOMAs experienced greater marriage rates
and reduced divorce rates compared to those states that remained
DOMA-free.
Again, using SPSS, I conducted an independent-sample-mean-t-test
to determine whether statistically significant differences marked DOMA
and non-DOMA states for pre- and post-DOMA marriage trends and pre-
and post-DOMA divorce trends.'0 8 Recall, the hypothesis was that the
DOMA impacts marriage and divorce rates differently in DOMA states
and non-DOMA states, as discussed supra. The second hypothesis pre-
108. An independent-sample mean t-test compares two independent groups to determine
whether the average measurement for a particular characteristic differs between two groups. Statis-
tics Workshops: Tests of Means, WADSWORTH CENGAGE LEARNING (2005),
http://www.wadsworth.com/psychologyd/templates/student-resources/workshops/stat workshp/test
means/test means 15.html. I used the Welch-Satterthwaite equation to perform the t-test because
the sample sizes differ and the samples possess unequal variances (a measure of dispersion, repre-
sented as the average squared distance between the sample's mean and each data-point in the sam-
ple).
N
Pre Post Pre Post
DOMA amend-
ment and statute 4.08 3.82 -0.125 -0.001* 24
DOMA statute
only 3.92 3.49 -0.096 -0.004* 12
NoDOMA 3.99 3.62 -0.036 -0.041* 6
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dicted that the average rate of decline for divorce would be greatest in
those states that passed an amendment compared with those states that
passed only a statute or nothing at all. The results demonstrated other-
wise.
Table Three indicates that no statistically significant difference sep-
arated the DOMA and non-DOMA states in the divorce and marriage
trends prior to enactment of DOMA legislation. The average rate of de-
cline of marriage was greater for the DOMA states than the non-DOMA
states prior to the enactment of any amendments, -.25 and -.22 respec-
tively. 109 And for divorce trends, the analysis revealed that DOMA states
actually had a greater rate of decline compared with non-DOMA states, -
.1 versus -.09, respectively.1 10 These extremely slight differences were
not surprising and do not rise to the level of statistical significance or
substantive significance. Instead, the results established a baseline that
prior to DOMA-amendment passage, and the significant publicity asso-
ciated with it, states of each category were behaving fundamentally simi-
larly with regard to family formation and dissolution-i.e. fewer mar-
riages and fewer divorces.
TABLE THREE
COMPARISON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE TRENDS BETWEEN DOMA AND
NON-DOMA STATES PRIOR TO AMENDMENT PASSAGE
Marriage Trend Divorce Trend n
DOMA -0.22 -0.1 31
Non-DOMA -0.25 -0.09 19
But the key question is: What happened after DOMA's enactment?
No statistically significant difference marked the two groups of states
after the passage of DOMA. The average decline in marriage or divorce
after DOMA does not differ in any statistically meaningful way between
those states that adopted an amendment and those that did not. Post-
DOMA, the decline in marriage was greater for DOMA states than non-
DOMA states, -.26 versus -.12. Moreover, the falling divorce rates were
109. While all measurements discussed infra represent average or mean rates of decline, for
ease of reading, the text uses the shorthand "decline" to represent this measurement.
110. However, despite a trend of lesser decline in divorce rates prior to DOMA amendment
ratifications for non-DOMA states, these states, on average, began with lower divorce rates than
DOMA states. It is important not to confuse the average divorce and marriage rates with the average
rate of change in the divorce and marriage rates. Put another way, DOMA states, prior to the passage
of DOMA amendments, had a greater rate of decline in divorce than non-DOMA states, but these
states also have lower marriage rates and greater divorce rates than non-DOMA states. Accordingly,
DOMA states start from a place of greater marital instability than non-DOMA states. See infra Part
.D. I.
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greater in non-DOMA states than DOMA states, -.011 and -.008, respec-
tively.
It was perhaps surprising that DOMA states, after the passage of a
DOMA, appear to have a slower rate of decline in divorce and an in-
creased rate of decline in marriage compared to non-DOMA states. Put
another way, non-DOMA states showed a smaller decrease in marriage
rates and a greater decrease in divorce rates compared with states that
passed DOMA legislation. However, these results were not statistically
significant; however, they were of some social significance: the results
suggested some intriguing evolution around the institution of marriage in
DOMA states. Specifically, these states, compared with non-DOMA
states, already had lower marriage rates, which appeared to be declining
further, while also possessing higher divorce rates. Thus, the data sug-
gested that the institution of marriage might be slightly more vulnerable
in DOMA states."
While no statistically significant differences emerged between the
two groups of states in the analysis, the substantive differences are worth
noting. Post-DOMA, the decline of marriage varied quite a bit between
the two groups of states. While in all other areas the trends were negligi-
ble, the average drop in marriages post-DOMA enactment for DOMA
states was more than double that of non-DOMA states. Certainly, the
results should be read with caution, but they do raise some skepticism
about the power of DOMAs to create family stability. Put simply, DO-
MAs did not appear to be associated with increased marriages, and for
those marriages that did occur, DOMA did not reduce the risk of divorce.
TABLE FOUR
COMPARISON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE TRENDS BETWEEN DOMA AND
NON-DOMA STATES AFTER AMENDMENT PASSAGE
Marriage Trend Divorce Trend n
DOMA -0.26 -0.008 31
Non-DOMA -0.12 -0.011 19
This preliminary1 l2 analysis suggested that DOMA is not statistical-
ly associated with increases in marriage rates or decreases in divorce
111. See infra Part II.C-D (discussing this study's results regarding marriage and divorce rates
and trends).
112. I use the word "preliminary" because this trend data contains a maximum of ten years of
analysis. More data is always ideal to truly capture whether trends are emerging. See Langbein &
Yost, supra note 78, at 306-07.
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rates. 13 In other words, the analysis did not appear to support either hy-
pothesis. Specifically, DOMA does not appear relevant to the narrative
of why marriage plays an increasingly less visible role in family for-
mation in the United States, particularly in DOMA states.114
Such a conclusion raises another question, however. If DOMA
amendments or statutes are possibly irrelevant to the institution of mar-
riage, what does appear to be associated with predicting marriage and
divorce rates and trend changes in states?...
C. Marriage Trends
We begin with marriage. Prior to the passage of DOMA, three vari-
ables predicted, with statistical significance,"' 6 a state's marriage trend."'
First, the percent of families living below the poverty line had a moder-
ate correlation (-.47) with the declining marriage trend such that the
greater the number of families living in poverty, the greater the decline in
a state's marriage rate." 8 In other words, those living in poverty were
increasingly less likely to marry than their counterparts with greater re-
sources. Similarly, with a correlation of -.36, the greater the proportion
of people in a state who said that religion plays an important role in daily
life, the greater the reduction in the state's marriage rate. Thus, more
religiosity in a state's population tended to mean fewer marriages. Final-
ly, a correlation of -.35 existed between children living in a single-parent
household and the variable, marriage trends. In other words, the greater
113. Given how large the standard deviations were for each group of slopes, and the relatively
small but inflexible sample size, achieving enough statistical power to find statistical significance
would be incredibly challenging. I ran alternative analyses eliminating outliers in an attempt to
decrease the standard deviation and increase the chance of detecting an effect should one exist. But
even under the most conservative testing, the sample size must also decrease to accommodate elimi-
nating outliers. Thus, the more compelling story is one of substantive significance rather than statis-
tical significance. "Statistical power" refers to the possibility of making a Type 11 error, in which we
conclude that no difference exists between the means of the two groups when one does. Social
science, by convention, recommends no more than a .2 chance of this occurring. WILLIAM M. K.
TROCHIM & JAMES P. DONNELLY, RESEARCH METHODS KNOWLEDGE BASE 256-60 (3d ed. 2007).
114. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OLD:
1960 TO PRESENT (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/tabCH-
I.xis.
115. This question is noteworthy because, while the rates of change do not appear to be statisti-
cally significant before and after DOMA enactments for DOMA states over non-DOMA states, the
average marriage rates are statistically significant. Marriage seems to be a more robust institution in
states that do not have DOMA laws.
116. For each correlation in this section p < .01.
117. A full description of correlations of all of these variables appears in Appendix C.
118. "Correlation" refers to the strength of an association between two variables. The coeffi-
cient ranges from zero to one, with zero representing no correlation and one representing a perfect
positive correlation. DAVID STOCKBURGER, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS: CONCEPTS, MODELS, AND
APPLICATIONS 158 (2d ed. 2001). Correlations in the .4 to .7 range are considered moderate to
strong. See B. BURT GERSTMAN, SAN JOSE STATE UNIV., STATPRIMER 14: CORRELATION, at 14.5,
available at http://www.sjsu.edulfaculty/gerstman/StatPrimer/correlation.pdf.
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the proportion of children living in single parent households in a state,
the greater the decline in marriage in that state.119
However, a much richer profile of marriage can be developed by
examining other characteristics that are associated with the variables
which are also correlated with the marriage-decline trend and marriage
rates generally. For example, the percent of families living below the
poverty line is significantly associated with the number of males and
females living in the state who have been married three or more times;
the percent who say religion is an important part of daily life; and the
number of single-parent households. In each of these relationships, the
correlation was positive. In other words, those with families who live
below the poverty line are more likely to have married three or more
times, to view religion as important to daily life, and to live in a single-
parent household with children.
Conversely, a negative correlation linked the variable percent of
families living below the poverty line with two other variables-
disposable income and the percent of the population-with a bachelor's
degree. Thus, the greater the median disposable income in the state and
the greater the percent of the population in the state with a bachelor's
degree, the fewer the percent of families living below the poverty line.
Not surprisingly, an extremely strong correlation existed between median
disposable income and percent of population with a bachelor's degree.
The next variable, religion as an important part of daily life, shares
statistically significant correlations with other traits that flesh out the
profile of why certain states have lower or higher declining marriage
trends. The median age of marriage for men and women in a state, the
median disposable income, and the percent of the population with a
bachelor's degree were all negatively related with the percent of the pop-
ulation who view religion as an important part of daily life. Conversely, a
positive connection emerged between religion as an important part of
daily life and the percent of men and women married three or more
times, and the percent of conservatives over liberals living in a state.
Thus, an individual who views religion as an important part of daily
life was more likely to have married three or more times, to identify as
conservative, to have married young, to have little disposable income or
to be living below the poverty line, and is unlikely to have a college de-
gree.
119. It might appear that single-parent households are an obvious consequence of the decision
not to marry or to marry and then divorce. However, out-of-wedlock births play a significant role in
access to and stability of marriage in a number of important ways. An out-of-wedlock birth signifi-
cantly decreases the chances of ever marrying. Births prior to marriage significantly increase the
odds that a marriage will end earlier than births that occur after marriage. CASEY E. COPEN ET AL.,
NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, FIRST MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE
2006-2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 7-8 (2012).
2014] 305
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
An analysis of the data after the passage of DOMA revealed almost
identical results. Poverty rates and proportion of single-parent house-
holds in a state best predict how rapidly the rate of marriage declines in a
state. The only variable that was no longer directly associated with post-
DOMA marriage trends was religion as an important part of daily life.
However, that particular variable strongly mediates 120 every other varia-
ble in the profile. Therefore, we can conclude that the passage of state
DOMA amendments had no measurable association with stemming the
decline of marriage, but, in fact, other variables most certainly did.
D. Divorce
The divorce-trend analysis revealed almost identical patterns to
those for marriage. Pre-DOMA divorce was negatively correlated with
the proportion of the population with families living in poverty or in sin-
gle-parent households. These associations are moderate, -.4 for both.121
As with the marriage analysis, the same variables exhibited an indirect
relationship with divorce, which were mediated through the poverty and
single-parent household variables. Thus, states with a higher percentage
of individuals who have a bachelor's degree also have a higher percent-
age of individuals with a larger amount of disposable income, who marry
at a later age, who are less likely to marry three or more times, who are
less likely to be politically conservative, and who are less likely to be-
lieve religion is an important part of daily life. And, in turn, these states
had fewer families living in poverty and children living in single-parent
households.
States that meet this profile had lower divorce rates even though the
average trend in the decline of divorce is not statistically significantly
different from those states that had a larger portion of their population
without a college degree, with less disposable income, who marry
young, 122 who view religion as an important part of daily life, who marry
three or more times, and who are more likely to be conservative. 123 Stat-
ed simply, both types of states were experiencing a decreasing divorce
trend (and continue to do so); but overall, impoverished states had fewer
marriages, but more divorces than those states with greater resources.
120. "Mediates" is a statistical term of art that means one variable is not directly associated
with another, but may affect a third variable through its association with the second one. Reuben M.
Baron & David A. Kenny, The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological
Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1173, 1176 (1986).
121. Importance of religion no longer has a direct relationship with divorce trends. However, it
has an indirect relationship with the two key variables as well as the other mediated variables.
122. "Young" refers to an age of marriage below the national median for age of first marriage.
123. Recall that achieving statistical significance with a small sample that includes very large
standard deviations is virtually impossible when the possible effects are marginal to begin with, but
the analysis does reveal what is statistically significantly associated with marriage and divorce trends
as discussed above. See supra note 113.
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1. Discussion
The analysis suggests that DOMA states did not fare any better than
non-DOMA states in terms of the strengthening of the "bonds and bene-
fits to society of heterosexual marriage." 24 In fact, the analysis offers an
alternative theory. In this study, DOMA states tended to have lower mar-
riage rates, larger declines in the trend towards marriage, 125 and greater
divorce rates. Moreover, the decrease in the relevancy of marriage and
the greater divorce rates in DOMA states for those individuals who actu-
ally were married (and remarry) seem to be directly related with poverty
and indirectly related with educational and economic opportunities.
These results raise the following question: If DOMA is so clearly
not associated with the strength of marriage-yet poverty, education, and
economic opportunities clearly are-why then, does DOMA carry the
political and legal traction that it does as a response to the concern
around family instability? 26 The next section attempts to address this
question with a moral entrepreneurism theoretical model.
II. THE ENDURING ATTRACTION OF DOMA
A. Moral Entrepreneurism
Howard Becker developed the idea that the construction and appli-
cation of deviance labels (in the case at hand, homosexuals demanding
access to marriage) is a moral enterprise.127 Individuals draw on power
and resources from social structures and cultural institutions to create the
abstract notion of something or someone as deviant.128 Those who define
certain behaviors or characteristics as deviant are known as moral entre-
preneurs.129 Relying on interest groups, moral entrepreneurs engage in a
multistep process to label a group or behavior as deviant because of the
moral entrepreneurs' fear, distrust, or suspicion of this group.130 The
stages include generating awareness and moral conversion.
124. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2012)
(articulating the goals of enacting DOMA).
125. Recall that trend analysis looks at average changes in the rates of marriage from one year
to the next over a specific time period. Rate analysis looks at one period of time. See supra notes 96
and 103.
126. See, e.g., Patrick H. Caddell & Douglas E. Schoen, Romney, Obama Must Address Crisis
of US. Families, POLITICO (June 12, 2012, 21:27 EDT),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77338.html (arguing that the hidden election issue is the
crisis of the family and the serious implications that arise from it, which both parties and candidates
are ignoring, as well as other cultural institutions, and expressing the key concern that only 52% of
the U.S. population is married-the lowest rate ever recorded in the census).
127. HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 162-63
(1963).
128. PATRICIA A. ADLER & PETER ADLER, CONSTRUCTIONS OF DEVIANCE: SOCIAL POWER,
CONTEXT, AND INTERACTION 149 (7th ed. 2012).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 150.
131. Id. at 150-52.
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Moral entrepreneurs define a problem and create public conscious-
ness of it by generating danger messages.132 In the present case, the prob-
lem is the perceived weakening of the institution of marriage and family,
which are supposedly embattled. The danger message is that marriage is
under attack by an already well-defined deviant group-homosexuals-
who wish to further undermine matrimony's meaning as a union between
opposite-sex individuals.'33
To increase the credibility of their claims, moral entrepreneurs en-
gage experts with specific knowledge of the social problem to package
and present facts via media outlets in an attempt to show that the social
problem's origins are highly influenced by another social issue.' 3 4 Here,
the social problem is the vulnerability of marriage as a central institution
of the family, and the connected social issue is homosexual couples.'35
With regard to the assault on marriage by same-sex couples, a mul-
titude of social science studies 36 employed by a host of statistic-touting
experts 37 showing the rise in incidence of divorce, decline in marriage,
132. Id
133. Observe, though, that the social ills defined as attacking the institution of marriage all
implicate women. Recall, the federal DOMA legislation was prefaced with language that stated to
the effect that, to permit same-sex marriage "would further devalue an institution already reeling
from no-fault divorce, the sexual revolution, and out-of-wedlock births." See supra note 23 and
accompanying text. After all, the National Association of Women Lawyers drafted legislation to
promote no-fault divorce. SELMA MOIDEL SMITH, STANFORD U., WOMEN'S LEGAL HIST., A
CENTURY OF ACHIEVEMENT: THE CENTENNIAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN
LAWYERS (1998), available at http://wlh.law.stanford.edulwp-content/uploads/201 1/01/smith-a-
century-of-achievement.pdf; see Sharon Johnson, No-Fault Divorce: 10 Years Later, Some Virtues,
Some Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1979, at A22. Women were the key drivers behind the sexual
revolution. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); MARGARET SANGER,
WHAT EVERY GIRL SHOULD KNOW (1916). Finally, women seem to be blamed for the rise in out-of-
wedlock births. See generally Isabel Sawhill, 20 Years Later, It Turns out Dan Quayle Was Right
About Murphy Brown and Unmarried Moms, WASH. POST OPINIONS (May 25, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/20-years-later-it-tums-out-dan-quayle-was-right-about-
murphy-brown-and-unmarried-moms/2012/05/25/gJQAsNCJqU story.html (the author, a Brookings
Institute Fellow, arguing that Dan Quayle was correct in criticizing women for raising children
without the father present and calling it just another "lifestyle choice").
134. ADLER & ADLER, supra note 128, at 150-51.
135. In support of his animus analysis, Justice Kennedy cited to the following passages from
DOMA's legislative history: "The effort to redefine 'marriage' to extend to homosexual couples is a
truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of marriage." United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12-13 (1996)) (internal
quotation mark omitted). "The House concluded that DOMA expresses 'both moral disapproval of
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (espe-
cially Judeo-Christian) morality."' Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 16 (1996)).
136. See, e.g., Mark R. Schneider, In Defense of Marriage: Preserving Marriage in a Post-
modern Culture, 17 TRINITY L. REV. 125, 142, 151 (2011); Lynn D. Wardle, The Boundaries of
Belonging: Allegiance, Purpose and the Definition of Marriage, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 287, 308-09
(2011).
137. For example, Brian Brown, President of the National Organization for Marriage, Tony
Perkins, President of the Family Research Council, Dale Showengerdt, legal counsel for the Alliance
Defense Fund, and Jim Daly, President of Focus on the Family, all hold themselves out as experts on
the issue. See, e.g., Brian Brown, NOM Blog, NAT'L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE,
http://www.nomblog.coml (last visited June 12, 2014); FRC Staff Tony Perkins: President, FAM.
RES. COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=by03h27 (last visited June 12, 2014); Why Protect
Marriage: The Key to Understanding the Fight for Marriage, CENTER FOR ARIZ. POL'Y (July 29,
2014] ALL THAT HEAVEN WILL ALLOW 309
increase in adultery, etc.' 38 to bring about a moral conversion.' 39 A few
key ingredients make conversion particularly effective. First is the link-
age of the social ill-the decline of the married family-with a "danger-
ous class,"1" homosexuals desiring same-sex marriage.141 The next in-
gredient is what Reinarman refers to as "A Kernel of Truth."' 4 2 The per-
ceived social ill has some basis of truth to it. Specifically, marriage rates
had been declining and the divorce rate did rise in the two decades pre-
ceding the moral entrepreneurs' perceived need to respond to "families in
crisis" in the early 1990s.143
Also, the media play a key role in the "routinization of carica-
ture.""'4 In other words, episodic events appear as epidemic; additionally,
worst-case scenarios appear as typical ones, which dramatize the social
problem.145 Applying this concept here, we need to look no further than
the context analysis described in the prior section, which outlines the
discourse behind the rationales for passing a state DOMA amendment.146
The most recent state to pass a DOMA amendment, North Carolina, pro-
vides two good examples of these techniques.147 First, an issue policy
brief asserted that in same-sex-marriage states, teachers are required to
teach homosexuality to elementary school children as part of a set cur-
2011), http://blog.azpolicy.org/marriage-family/why-protect-marriage-the-key-to-understanding-the-
fight-for-marriage/; Jim Daly, Messages from Our President, FoCUS ON FAM.,
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about us/profiles/jim daly/messages.aspx (last visited June 12,
2014).
138. See, e.g., Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendants-Appellants at 16-2 1, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d
I (1st Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214), 2011 WL 494356.
139. ADLER & ADLER, supra note 128, at 152.
140. CRAIG REINARMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DRUG SCARES (1994), reprinted in
CONSTRUCTIONS OF DEVIANCE: SOCIAL POWER, CONTEXT, AND INTERACTION 159, 165 (Patricia A.
Adler & Peter Adler eds., 7th ed. 2012). Although Reinarman has developed a theory related to drug
scares, I assert that this model has equal application to the same-sex marriage issue.
141. Reinarman observes that drug scares are about the use of a drug by particular groups of
people who are typically already perceived by powerful groups as some kind of threat. Id. (citing
TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAW, DRUGS, AND MORAL JUDGMENT (1970)).
Reinarman observes that Prohibition was motivated by the alcohol usage of immigrant, Catholic,
working-class drinkers, not alcohol consumption generally. Id. Likewise, drug laws in California
came about not because of opiate usage by the masses, but because of Chinese opium dens. Id.
Finally, the drug war of the 1980s emerged not when college kids started snorting cocaine, but when
crack cocaine could be linked to lower class African-Americans. Id. In each instance, the social
problem is linked to a group perceived as a threat. Id.
142. Id. at 163.
143. COONTZ, supra note 3, at 263 (pointing out that by the end of the 1970s, the divorce rate's
effect was exacerbated by alternatives to marriage and the radical reduction in remarriages, general-
ly); Amitai Etzioni, The Family: Is It Obsolete?, 14 J. CURRENT SOC. ISSUES 4 (1977) (asserting that
if the divorce rate continued at its current pace, not one American family would remain intact by the
1990s).
144. REINARMAN, supra note 140, at 163 (emphasis omitted).
145. Id.
146. See supra Part LA for a detailed discussion of the content and language employed in the
media to rationalize the passage of DOMA amendments.
147. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6 (approved 2012).
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riculum.148 However, this assertion relied on one extreme example for
support.149 Second, the policy brief alleged that religious leaders have
been jailed for speaking out against homosexuality.15 0 For support, the
brief cites to a general assertion that this jailing occurs in Canada. 5 1
What is particularly compelling with this technique is the idea that a vul-
nerable population is at risk, and the effects of the social problem are
spreading to that population.15 2 In the instant case, children are at risk if
same-sex marriage is allowed.'53 Not just children of same-sex couples,
mind you, but all children are threatened.154
The final ingredient in this moral enterprise is scapegoating. Scape-
goating blames the effects of a social problem on a particular group who
are only tangentially related to the social ill.' 55 Moreover, these effects
148. "In states where same-sex 'marriage' is legal, such as Massachusetts, children are taught
in school that homosexuality is normal, and that same-sex unions are the legal and moral equivalent
of traditional marriage." N.C. FAMILY POLICY COUNCIL, THE MARRIAGE PROTECTION
AMENDMENT: TEN REASONS WHY LEGISLATORS SHOULD LET THE PEOPLE VOTE 4, available at
http://ncfamily.org/issuebriefs/1 10301 -IB-MarProtAmdt.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
149. The brief states:
For example, a lesbian teacher in Massachusetts, who teaches sex education to 8th grad-
ers, told National Public Radio (NPR) that she answers students' questions about homo-
sexuality using a chart listing different sexual activities, and then asks them whether two
people of the same sex can engage in those activities. She told NPR she asks students,
"Can a woman and a woman have vaginal intercourse, and they will all say no. And I'll
say, 'Hold it. Of course, they can. They can use a sex toy."' She also said her response to
any challenges from parents would be, "Give me a break. It's legal now."
Id
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. For example, Richard McCorkle and Terance Miethe noted in their study on the response
to gangs through moral panics that attention to the alleged problem grew rapidly when the media
reported the "apparent movement of gang activity ... from the traditionally 'troubled' neighbor-
hoods to recreation centers, theaters, and public schools across the city." Richard C. McCorkle &
Terance D. Miethe, The Political and Organizational Response to Gangs: An Examination of a
"Moral Panic" in Nevada, 15 JUST. Q. 41, 48 (1998). The authors also observed that attention
increased once again when an outbreak of high school violence was attributed to gang movement
from the street to high school campuses. Id. at 49-50. Finally, a school shooting in a high school
cafeteria was described by police as a "gang-related slaying," although such conclusion was never
confirmed. Id at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Sarah Wildman, Children Speak for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at El
(discussing the debate over the effects of same-sex marriage on children and referencing the follow-
ing position shared by same-sex marriage opponents: "'The real question is whether same-sex rela-
tionships benefit children to the same extent that living with a married mother and father does, and
we believe they do not,' said Peter S. Sprigg, senior fellow for policy studies at the Family Research
Council, the conservative Christian organization. 'Children do best when raised by their own biolog-
ical mother and father who are committed to one another in a lifelong marriage."'); see supra Part
L.A (detailing the ways in which children will be harmed by same-sex marriage according to DOMA
proponents).
154. Creating this illusion is crucial because, according to Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-
Yehuda, disproportionality, or the degree that the public focuses concern on the problem-here,
same-sex marriage as the cause of family disintegration-to the exclusion of far more damaging
(and realistic) sources of the crisis, such as poverty, access to education, and stable employment,
determines the viability of the moral panic. ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL
PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE 36 (1994).
155. A closely related term refers to scapegoats as "folk devils" because their behaviors are
deemed selfish and harmful to society. Id. at 29. It becomes paramount to neutralize their actions so
society can return to normal. Id.
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usually precede the alleged causal connection between the social prob-
lem and the identified deviant group. Reinarman argues that scape-
goating may be the most essential element of the process because "it
gives great explanatory power and thus broader resonance to claims
about the horrors of [the social problem].",57 Scapegoating same-sex
families is equally cogent in the DOMA campaign.
B. Moral Panics
Blaming homosexual couples as the source of the United States'
ongoing family crisis was particularly effective because the social prob-
lem was acutely ripe for a moral panic.' 58 The public was predisposed to
believe the notion that the "family in crisis" had hit epidemic propor-
tions, especially when infamous or noteworthy individuals declared it
so.159 In turn, legislators responded to the moral panic with the rapid en-
156. Volatility is also a crucial ingredient. The issue seems to erupt suddenly. Same-sex mar-
riage as the cause of family crisis erupted suddenly when the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision
striking down legislation that barred same-sex couples from marrying. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44 (Haw. 1993). While the issue of family in crisis had always had political attraction, the redefining
of marriage by a court to include same-sex couples gave it new life. Recall that during the 1992
Clinton campaign, families were in crisis because of "welfare queens." Clarence Page, Romney's
Welfare Queen, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 2012, at 25. Another interesting example comes from Great
Britain. In 1968, Mary Bell, at the age of 11, killed two toddlers. Ann Bradley, A Morality Play for
Our Times, 63 LIVING MARXISM 10, 13 (1994). In contrast, when in the early 1990s two boys killed
a toddler, a moral panic ensued because the act was emblematic of the decline of British society. Id.
at 10. The result was a series of legislative enactments to solve the problem of children murdering
children. David Smith & Kiyoko Sueda, The Killing of Children by Children as a Symptom of Na-
tional Crisis: Reactions in Britain and Japan, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 5 (2008), available at
http://www.sagepub.com/lawrencestudy/articles/intro/Smith.pdf. And, as is the case with DOMA
and same-sex marriage, evidence that the enacted solutions would solve the "crisis" was irrelevant.
157. REINARMAN, supra note 140, at 165.
158. "Moral panic" refers to a situation in which public fears and state response greatly exag-
gerate the alleged threat attributed to the target group. The concept emerged from studies Stanley
Cohen conducted in Britain in the 1960s on the "Mods and Rockers." Cohen characterized a moral
panic as a situation where a social ill or group of persons is identified as a "threat to societal values
and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the
moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, [and] politicians . . . ." McCorkle & Miethe, supra
note 152, at 43 (quoting STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF
MODS AND ROCKERS 9 (1972)).
159. For example, Dr. James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, asserted in 2004, at the
height of DOMA amendment campaigns, that:
The legalization of homosexual marriage will quickly destroy the traditional family.
... [W]hen the state sanctions homosexual relationships and gives them its blessing, the
younger generation becomes confused about sexual identity and quickly loses its under-
standing of lifelong commitments, emotional bonding, sexual purity, [and] the role of
children in a family ....
JAMES DOBSON, MARRIAGE UNDER FIRE: WHY WE MUST WIN THIS BATTLE 47 (2004). Judson
Phillips, founder of the Tea Party Nation, was quoted in an article as declaring that:
[M]arriage equality for gays and lesbians is part of the "east coast liberal freak show"
bent on ruining America ....
While there are many religious and moral arguments that can be made about this, the
simple fact is for the last sixty years or so[,] the left has been attacking the basic family
unit. The end result of this has been the creation of poverty where none existed before. It
has been the creation of an under class, bom and raised in poverty, unlikely to escape
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actment of DOMA at the federal level with individual states quickly fol-
lowing suit.
Moral panics can play a crucial role for those possessing political,
economic, or religious power.160 Often, the creation of such a panic can
distract from a more intractable social issue. For example, when Britain
was suffering from a severe recession in the 1970s, the ruling class creat-
ed a moral panic around street crime to distract the public from the coun-
try's declining economic situation. "By exploiting the public's fear of
crime, the ruling class shifted the focus from an ailing British economy
to street muggings, thereby protecting their own economic interests
.... " Similarly, one might argue that emphasizing same-sex marriage
as the cause of what ails the American family served the power elite. It
diverted attention away from the glaring reality of economic policies that
benefited the power elite at the expense of particular types of American
families. 6 1
Most fascinating is the framing that the conservative family policy
groups employ to implicate what has occurred over the last few decades
as an "American Experiment."l 63 Indeed, even one of the attorneys argu-
ing against the legalization of same-sex marriage before the Supreme
Court invoked the term. M The Institute for American Values observes
that a clear dividing line demarcates marital access and stability between
poverty and encouraged to engage in the same behaviors that landed their parents in pov-
erty.
Tashman, supra note 71 (quoting Judson Phillips in a statement to Tea Party Nation members on
May 31, 2012).
160. Often these power roles work in tandem. For example, many politicians hold political
power along with a significant largesse and use this power to express unabashed religious views-
George W. Bush, Mitt Romney, and Sarah Palin, to name a few. Indeed, the most successful moral
crusaders are those in the upper strata of society. Research conducted on the pro-life movement and
anti-pomography revealed that the crusaders originated in the lower class, thus explaining their
limited success-until recently-to have these issues refrained as legally unacceptable. Justin L.
Tuggle & Malcolm D. Holmes, Blowing Smoke: Status Politics and the Shasta County Smoking Ban,
18 DEVIANT BEHAV. 77, 79 (1997).
161. McCorkle & Miethe, supra note 152, at 44 (citing STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE
CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER (1978)). Moral Panics certainly take on a
phenomenological life of their own, but beforehand individuals or groups carefully put the key
ingredients in place.
162. Professor Carbone observes that "[t]he family crisis is tied to a changing economy; yet
that economy is largely invisible in the moral-values debate." Carbone, supra note 49, at 355. She
goes on to note that "[same-sex marriage bans] simply serve to keep anxiety about the American
family alive without doing anything to address the country's real needs. A genuine family agenda
would take the initiative in addressing the country's changing economic circumstances, starting with
employment." Id. at 356.
163. UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE NEW
MIDDLE AMERICA 15 (W. Bradford Wilcox & Elizabeth Marquardt eds., 2010), available at
http://stateofourunions.org/2010/SOOU2010.pdf. But see Carbone, supra note 49, at 356 (arguing
that the ability to marry and stay married is defined by educational attainment and class).
164. Steven T. Dennis & John Gramlich, 12 Best Gay Marriage Moments at the Supreme
Court, ROLL CALL (Mar. 26, 2013, 4:22 PM),
http://www.rolIcall.com/news/12_best gaymarriagemomentsat the supreme court-223456-
I.html.
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the classes.165 However, the dividing line has clearly shifted in the last
few decades such that the middle class now find themselves shut out at
the proverbial church door. The "most consequential marriage trend of
our time concerns the broad center of our society, where marriage, that
iconic middle-class institution, is floundering."'6 The report couches the
lack of access to marriage as a "retreat"1 67 -perhaps unintentionally-
suggesting that the middle class made a conscious decision to try out
what it would be like to not marry for a generation or so.
Conversely, marriage stability has remained consistently strong for
the last four decades amongst the educated upper class and upper-middle
class.168 Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that DOMA was espe-
cially needed in those states that lacked educational and economic re-
sources to stave off the impending attack on a set of marriages already
weakened and becoming increasingly rarified. Taken to its logical con-
clusion, the argument might go like this: of course states with higher
educated populations, with more income, and with delayed age of first
marriage could withstand same-sex marriages amongst its population.
These are not the types of states with the most marriages at risk.
Therein lies the appeal of the moral panic to the family in crisis
question.169 Status politics play out an efficient and effective one-two
165. The institution's report, in combination with another one it authored, The Revolution in
Parenthood: The Emerging Global Clash Between Adult Rights and Children's Needs, is emblemat-
ic of moral entrepreneurs effectively creating a moral panic. See generally UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L
MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 163; ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE
REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND
CHILDREN'S NEEDS (2006), available at http://www.americanvalues.org/search/item.php?id-48. In
fact, these reports could serve as a textbook for how to create a moral panic around family crisis.
They contain the requisite academic experts explaining how middle America's attitudes and behav-
ior do not serve them well, as such attitudes seek to adopt a "'soul mate' model of marriage" over
the "older 'institutional' model of marriage." UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note
163, at 28. Marquardt discounts studies demonstrating that same-sex marriage is not harmful.
MARQUARDT, supra, at 19-22. Moreover, Marquardt devotes a significant portion of her report to
establishing that a vulnerable population exists when she writes, "[I]n both the sciences and in the
voices of children we learn that biology does matter." Id. at 21. She discusses the safety of chil-
dren-and the risks of stepparents who lack biological connection to children in the household. Id. at
20. She then equates these violent stepparents with same-sex parents. Id. at 21-22. However, citing
recent developments in artificial reproduction that involve creating eggs and sperm from stem cells,
she cautions, "The technique raises the possibility that gay couples will be able to have biological
children." Id at 27 (quoting Maxine Firth, Stem Cell Babies Could Have Single Parent, N.Z.
HERALD, June 21, 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Seemingly, same-sex couples cannot
win. They are unacceptable parents without both having a biological connection to the child, and
frankly, unfit parents because, as selfish folk devils, they view "human lives as fit for laboratory
experimentation for the benefit of others." Id at 27 28.
166. UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 163, at ix.
167. Id. at 15.
168. Id. at 16.
169. Moral panics allow for selective application of the scapegoat to the social ill according to
where it conveniently fits to support the narrative being offered. Power is central to this enterprise.
[L]aws ... are a product of political action by moral entrepreneurial interest groups that
are connected to society's power base....
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punch. First, the power elite can define certain kinds of families as lack-
ing in social mores, i.e. poor and middle class single-parent families,
while at the same time, implicating other kinds of families as exacerbat-
ing the first social ill, i.e. same-sex families. Second, the condemnation
of both groups "symbolically enhances the status of the abstinent through
the degradation of the participatory." 70 In other words, the power elite
legitimizes its superior moral value and superior position in the social
stratification through such discourse. In the case of same-sex couples'
demand for marriage, moral entrepreneurs engaged in "coercive re-
form"171 because these couples were "viewed as intractably denying the
moral and status superiority of the [political-economic-religious elites']
symbolic-moral universe." 7 2 And, at the same time, this "reform" dis-
tracted families who were experiencing their own massive instability
from examining the cause of their own plight.
Thus, a fair conclusion to draw might be that same-sex couples' de-
sire to marry has little to do with the current state of marginalized fami-
lies and perhaps has much to do with a carefully crafted moral panic for
political expediency.173 In other words, DOMA could very well be a by-
product of a fallacy.
The next query becomes, then, given the variables associated with
marital instability and given DOMA's apparent ineffective role in pro-
moting marital stability (and its possible demise), how should society
respond to the middle class's weakened marital state?
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Given that marriage, as an institution, has become a less viable op-
tion, especially for the middle and lower classes, one may be tempted to
lay blame at their feet. The nature of this blame may come in a variety of
forms. These forms are discussed below, followed by my recommenda-
tions for solving the effects of the middle class's weakened marital state.
A. Moral Failure
One approach might be to adopt the reasoning of the conservative
elite-both within the academy and political arenas-that middle and
... [T]hose positioned closer to the center of society, holding the greater social, econom-
ic, political, and moral resources, can turn the force of the deviant stigma onto others less
fortunately placed.
ADLER & ADLER, supra note 128, at 155-56.
170. Tuggle & Holmes, supra note 160, at 79.
171. Id "Coercive reform" refers to the enactment and enforcement of laws to force a particu-
lar group to comply with moral views espoused by the moral entrepreneur. Id. at 79-80.
172. Id
173. Admittedly, I do not have direct evidence that pro-DOMA interest groups developed a
purposeful strategy to create a moral panic, but rather, I infer from the discourse that theoretically, it
appears this sociological phenomenon emerged.
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lower classes do not act consistently with their best interests. 174 For in-
stance, the National Marriage Project and Institute for American Values
diagnose the problem as follows: Marriage has eroded in the middle class
because "moderately educated Americans are markedly less likely than
are highly educated Americans to embrace the bourgeois values and vir-
tues."1 75 To put it bluntly, the report explains that lower middle class
individuals are less likely to engage in self-control, delayed gratification,
and hard work.176 These virtues, the report claims, are the key to access-
ing a college education, and in turn, adopting an appropriate life planning
sequence-"education, work, marriage, and childbearing" in that or-
der.177
The culpability of the "shiftless"178  certainly has its appeal-
particularly when academics or politicians can point to the models of
marriage that are appropriate for one social class, but not the other. The
State of the Union report observes that while a "soul mate" model of
marriage may work for upper class Americans, middle class Americans
must abide by the "traditional" model of marriage in which "poor and
Middle Americans of a generation or two ago would have . . . been
markedly more likely to get and stay married, even if they did not have
much money or a consistently good relationship."1 79 According to the
174. Ronald Reagan often played up the concept of the "welfare queen" in his stump speeches
during his 1976 election bid to describe women who were scamming the government to obtain
benefits and services for themselves and their children instead of working for pay. See 'Welfare
Queen' Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1976, at 51. While Reagan is
often credited for coining the term "welfare queen", this is likely apocryphal as no actual record
exists of Reagan's use of the term. In actuality, the inventor of the term seems to be Linda Taylor at
"the Chicago Tribune, not the GOP politician." Josh Levin, The Welfare Queen, SLATE (Dec. 19,
2013, 12:41 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and_politics/history/2013/12/linda taylor welfare queen ronal
d reagan made her a notorious american villain.html.
175. UNIv. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 163, at 34.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. "Shiftless" is a term that came about during the slavery era to describe African-American
slaves as lazy, unambitious, and slow, but it currently has wider application to poor people. See
David Pilgrim, The Coon Caricature, FERRIS ST. U. (Oct. 2000),
http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/coon/ (last updated 2012).
179. UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 163, at 38-39. The soul mate model
of marriage is couple-centered, demanding "emotional intimacy" and "shared consumption" with the
"happiness of both spouses" as central to its survival. Id. at 38. Conversely, the traditional model of
marriage focuses on "parenthood, economic cooperation, and emotional intimacy in a permanent
union." Id at 38. However, consider Stephanie Coontz's assessment of marriages and families from
a generation or two ago, when the conservative elite would wax on about the ideal approach for
middle America. "Not only was the 1950s family a new invention; it was also a historical fluke,
based on a unique and temporary conjuncture of economic, social, and political factors." STEPHANIE
COONTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 28, 30-39
(1992). Coontz observed that, in reality, families during this period were characterized as one or both
partners experiencing daily misery; families hiding the sexual or physical abuse that occurred within
the family from the outside world; women who had been pushed out of the workforce became alien-
ated wives and mothers. The media's depiction of the 1950s American family ignored the poor
communities and minorities, who continued to face brutal discrimination. The period consisted of a
consistent heightened number of teen pregnancies, which resulted in marriage, as well as high rates
of prescription drug and alcohol abuse. Id. at 29-39. Moreover, while the American Values Institute
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Institute for American Values, the poor and middle classes don't have the
economic resources needed to succeed in an emotionally intensive soul-
mate union.'so
This analysis suggests shades of the 1965 Moynihan Report, in
which then Assistant Secretary of Labor, Daniel Moynihan, concluded
that the pathology of the African-American community had its origins in
the destabilized "Negro" family.' 81 The report has since been criticized
for its failure to examine all the data on black families available at the
time, and in particular, for its failure to acknowledge the adaptive strate-
gies that family formation will take in response to destabilized institu-
tions, especially the economy.1 82 Similarly, here, one might conclude that
a destabilized family is a consequence, not a cause-no more than same-
sex marriage would be a cause-of weakened social structures.1 83
Another explanation of middle class families' plight is the cultural
class-warfare syndrome as expressed in volumes such as What's the Mat-
ter with Kansas?'8 Under this model, middle class Americans are at fault
for their circumstances because they vote against their own interests.
Frank observes that we have a "French Revolution in reverse."l86 The
wealthy elite, politically conservative establishment developed a highly
effective discourse he calls "latte libel." 87 Instead of focusing on policy
criticizes the soul mate model as valuing consumption, Coontz points out that the "traditional fami-
ly" of the 1950s was defined by consumer consumption. See id. at 27-29.
180. UNIV. OF VA. NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 163, at 38-40.
181. See generally DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY:
THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965), available at
http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/webid-meynihan.htm.
1 82. Herbert J. Gans, The Moynihan Report and Its Aftermaths: A Critical Analysis, 8 DUBois
REV. 315, 318-20 (2011) (arguing that the report lacked the positivism required for such analysis to
have a meaningful effect).
183. In the early part of the twentieth century, sociologists Robert Park and Ernest Burgess
developed the Concentric Zone theory. See ROBERT E. PARK ET AL., THE CITY 50-55 (1925). The
theory explains that competition for resources means that certain land areas with limited social
structures will lead to adaptations by individuals living in those areas subject to the same ecological
pressures. See id. at 63-66. Thus, the idea that individuals develop characteristics in response to the
environment and resources available to them is not a new one.
184. See generally THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? How
CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004). Although culture as an expression of class
has long been debated by sociologists, Frank's book describes how the political mapping of the 2000
election brought the intersection of politics and class warfare into sharp relief as mediated through
culture. For an earlier discussion of the cultural class-warfare syndrome, see MICHAEL
HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 14-17 (1962). The idea of
culture as an expression of class has captured the imagination of family law scholars more recently.
See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 89; WILLIAMS, supra note 18.
185. Recent data, however, suggests otherwise. A report released by the PEW Foundation
reveals that 50% of its respondents who stated that they were middle class identified as Democrats,
compared to 39% who identified as Republicans. PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE
LOST DECADE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: FEWER, POORER, GLOOMIER 6 (2012), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/08/pew-social-trends-lost-decade-of-the-middle-
class.pdf.
186. FRANK, supra note 184, at 8.
187. Id. at 16-17.
316 [Vol. 91:2
ALL THAT HEA VEN WILL ALLOW 3
as the framework for voting in political parties, the economic and politi-
cal powerhouses shifted politics into a cultural class war.
In this cultural war, middle class Americans were duped into creat-
ing a backlash against their own economic interests based on judgments
about liberal elitism that comes from the coastal regions of the United
States-the cars they drive, the food they eat, the clothes they wear, the
music they listen to, the places where they vacation, the churches they do
not attend, etc.'89 The net result, according to Thomas Frank, is that:
Here is a movement whose response to the power structure is to make
the rich even richer; whose answer to the inexorable degradation of
working-class life is to lash out angrily at labor unions and liberal
workplace-safety programs; whose solution to the rise of ignorance
in America is to pull the rug out from under public education.
But Frank and those of his persuasion cast blame more broadly.
They point to the liberal, political, and economic elite as culpable too.' 9 1
Frank argues that the Left made an inexcusable error in refusing to talk
about class; in attempting to reframe itself as a party friendly to business;
and abandoning the issues that made the Democratic party appealing.' 92
The Left has engendered a deep-seated bitterness in middle-America that
is aimed at the once progressive platform of the Democratic party.'93
Joan Williams goes further: "A precondition for permanent political
change is a changed relationship between the white working-class and
the reform-minded elite. It is disheartening that . . . the upper-middle
class remains supremely uninterested in rethinking its relationship with
the Missing Middle." 94 Thus, these authors argue that the liberal elite
drove middle class Americans away with their condescension and intel-
lectual analysis, and into the hands of the Republican Party, which was
willing to embrace their anger-or more accurately, manipulate it for
political gain.' 9
The result is that the nation has economic and family policies that
have led to a high level of inequality. To be sure, the last thirty years has
seen the distance grow between the social classes.'9 6 But during the Great
Recession and subsequent recovery, in 2010 alone, the top 1% of Ameri-
ca's most wealthy gained 93% of the additional income created in the
188. See id. at 5-6.
189. See id at 16-20.
190. Id at 7.
191. Id at 242-48.
192. Id
193. Id at 8-9, 176-77.
194. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 211.
195. See id. at 212.
196. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 2-3 (2012).
2014] 17
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
United States.'97 During this same year, the ratio of pay between a typical
worker (a person lucky enough to have a job) and a CEO's annual com-
pensation was one to 243.198 Put another way, the top 1% had an average
annual income of $1.3 million while the bottom 20% earned an average
of $17,800 annually-and that was before the recession hit.' It seems
implausible to maintain that such incredible economic injustice does not
hurt the stability of the family.
A recent study released by the PEW Foundation catalogues the
losses experienced by the middle class. Of the 1,287 adults surveyed for
the study, 85% stated that it was more difficult to maintain a standard of
living than a decade ago.200 For the first time since World War II, income
has declined across all income tiers except the very top. 20 1 The size of the
middle class has actually shrunk over each of the last four decades.202 For
the upper class, the period has proved lucrative. Their incomes rose from
29% to 46% of the nation's pie.203 For the middle class, four decades
ago, their income made up 62% of the share.204 Now, it is only 45%.205
The lower class has remained relatively stable in its minimal share of the
nations' income- 10% in 1971, 9% in 2011.206
Wealth remains a crucial, yet elusive safety net for any family.
Wealth provides access to resources in times of economic hardships, but
even more so, it offers economic opportunities. However, wealth has
plummeted for middle- and lower-class families-specifically, by 28%
for the middle class and 45% for the lower class over the last four dec-
207
ades. Once again, if you were lucky enough to be born in the upper
class, your opportunities improved substantially. Upper-class families
acquired a greater portion of the nation's wealth during this same time
period.208
B. The Elusive Traditional Family
A frequent refrain in the conservative party is a return to the tradi-
tional family values of the 1950s-with images of Leave it to Beaver re-
runs fresh in our collective memories. 209 Nostalgic stories of low divorce
197. Id. at 3.
198. Id.
199. Id at 4.
200. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 185, at 166.
201. Id at 1.
202. Id. at 1-2.
203. Id. at 2.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id
207. Id at 2-3.
208. Id
209. Kevin Noble Mallard, The Myth of the Traditional Family, Contribution to The Opinion
Pages: Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/24/are-
family-values-outdated/the-myth-of-the-traditional-family (last updated Aug. 9, 2012, 11:35 AM).
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rates, high marriage rates, high fertility rates, and economic growth-
with the largest movement of poor people into the middle class-all cer-
tainly have resonance and appeal. However, the family of the 1950s was
not the last vestige of a long tradition of the stable American family.2 10 It
was a new and rare phenomenon born of massive economic growth
spurred on by housing starts and consumer spending-particularly for
household furnishings and appliances.2 11
Even more so, the traditional family of the 1950s was the invention
of American economic and family policy. Keith Olson observes that the
GI Bill was one of the most successful social programs ever created, at
least for whites.212 Veterans received free college tuition, a stipend, and
extra money if they had a family.213 No loans, just grants. Mortgages
214were available at very low rates. A rewritten tax code provided ad-
vantages to married couples.2 15 Such policies created the middle class,
and in turn, the possibility of family stability.
Economic stability did not create the cultural phenomena of the nos-
talgic "traditional" two-parent, male breadwinner, female home-maker
family. The media did.216 However, the recommendation that we provide
economic and educational opportunities to create economic stability is an
obvious one that Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz analyzes forceful-
ly. 2 17 Nevertheless, the ability to create family stability means discarding
210. ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA
13-14 (2008) ("[The 1950s family] was not ... the last gasp of 'traditional' family life with roots
deep in the past. Rather, it was the first wholehearted effort to create a home that would fulfill virtu-
ally all its members' personal needs . . . .").
211. See Keith W. Olson, The G. I. Bill and Higher Education: Success and Surprise, 25 AM.Q. 596 (1973) (discussing the implementation of the GI Bill as an anti-depression measure);
COONTZ, supra note 179, at 24-25.
212. Olson, supra note 211, at 610; COONTZ, supra note 179, at 223.
213. Olson, supra note 211, at 610 n.18; COONTz, supra note 179, at 223.
214. See COONTZ, supra note 179, at 223.
215. Id at 223-24. See generally MADELEINE M. KUNIN, THE NEW FEMINIST AGENDA:
DEFINING THE NEXT REVOLUTION FOR WOMEN, WORK, AND FAMILY 23-24 (2012); STIGLITZ, supra
note 196, at 4-5.
216. COONTZ, supra note 3, at 229-32.
217. Educational opportunities should be carefully assessed to match the growth areas in the
economy. For example, regulation of for-profit educational institutions is essential for the protection
of lower and middle classes seeking access to higher education-an area where they are frequently
shut out. Stiglitz cites data showing that 74% of students in the nation's most selective colleges
come from the top quartile of income earnings, while only 9% come from the bottom half of the
country's income earners. STIGLITZ, supra note 196, at 19. The effects of inequality for a child are
pervasive. In fact, a child born in an environment with few resources will find it difficult to ever
move out of poverty. Id. at 17-20. Recent data reveals that the middle class, who used to believe that
the American Dream was achievable, are increasingly alienated from the notion that working hard is
all it takes. TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 185, at 5. Finally, education cannot be the salve to childhood
poverty and family instability. Research shows that the predominant growth area for jobs in the
United States in the next decade will be in the service industry-low-paying jobs like home health
workers or social service providers, as well as business services. Richard Henderson, Industry Em-
ployment and Output Projections to 2020, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 65, 65-69 (Jan. 2012), available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/01/art4fill.pdf. Therefore, policy must address ways for low-
income families to garner support other than through wage income.
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a singular notion of a family model 218 that thrived for only one decade in
our history.219
To be sure, a two-parent household offers certain economic ad-
vantages. 220 These advantages, however, can be mirrored in a national
economic policy without necessarily demanding a two-parent household
model. Thus, other family structures can receive these benefits.221 It is
clear from the analysis above that, regardless of one's educational or
economic resources, marriage and fertility rates are both declining.222
America can be a hostile place to raise a child. As of December 2011,
57% of the nation's children are living in low income or poor house-
holds.223 The United States exhibits the "highest child poverty rate in the
developed world." 224 Unlike our European neighbors, we seem to focus
on marriage, not children.225 In a nation where "[p]oor kids who succeed
academically are less likely to graduate from college than richer kids
who do worse in school,"226 and where we know education strengthens
family stability, a new moral panic demands addressing the causes, not
the symptoms, of family crisis. Thus, this last section of the paper shifts
the focus from marriage and divorce rates to child outcomes. The analy-
sis above suggests that marriage and divorce play an increasingly less
visible role in family formation and stability. Thus, concentrating on a
child's quality of life is likely to create a setting that will increase family
stability.
C. Possible Solutions
1. Reformulate Resources with Children in Mind
As Stiglitz observes, this country virtually eradicated poverty for
227the elderly through social programs like Social Security and Medicare.
The decision to do nothing to eradicate child poverty should be viewed
228
as political as well as moral2. I argue that refocusing on children's ac-
cess to resources will go a long way toward creating family stability,
218. Indeed, the trend of marriage continues to decline, especially amongst the least educated.
Richard Fry, No Reversal in Decline of Marriage, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 20, 2012),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/11/20/no-reversal-in-decline-of-marriage/#src-prc-newsletter.
219. See CoONTz, supra note 3, at 229, 243-44.
220. See Wendy D. Manning & Susan Brown, Children's Economic Well-Being in Married
and Cohabitating Parent Families, 68 J. MARRIAGE& FAM. 345, 351 (2006).
221. In fact, families with three or more parents exist and may receive legal recognition in
California. Ian Lovett, Measure Opens Door to 3 Parents, or More, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at
A9.
222. JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS Sys., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2010,
at 1 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr6l/nvsr61 01.pdf; see id. at Table
I.
223. KUNIN, supra note 215, at 223.
224. Id. at I1.
225. ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND 15-16 (2010).
226. STIGLITZ, supra note 196, at 19.
227. Id. at 17.
228. Id.
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while undermining the scapegoating arguments behind DOMA. Research
reveals that Americans strongly value fairness. 229
The discourse of fairness must enter the family-in-crisis discus-
sion. 230 Other countries have chosen to create a wealth distribution sys-
tem that still allows for rewards, but reduces the amount of inequality
present in society, particularly by focusing on investing in resources for
231children. In doing so, the Left must respect, if not adopt, the morality
discourse with which the Right has become adept. It must re-engage
middle- and lower-class America-where the most destabilized families
are found.232
229. Id. at 153-54.
230. The idea of tax dollars going to assist other adults who we perceive as making life deci-
sions that we would not creates cognitive dissonance for some when it comes to the notion of fair-
ness. See, e.g., Myth-The Rich Don't Pay Their Fair Share, CONST. CONSERVATISM,
http://constitutionalconservative.wordpress.com/myth-the-rich-dont-pay-their-fair-share/ (last visited
Apr. 13, 2014).
231. For example, policies in Australia, the UK, France, and Brazil are known for reducing
inequality. See, e.g., KUNIN, supra note 215, at 34-35, 44-55, 225-30; STIGLITZ, supra note 196, at
5,18-19,21-23.
232. The empirical data show that religion plays a central role for these families experiencing
destabilization. Thus, refraining the family crisis as one involving a moral crisis around fairness,
greed, and hypocrisy can capture the imagination of these families. The Left is inclined to eschew
religion, as the data here reveals, but social justice for families is a moral theme. Moreover, the Left
must also be mindful of recent research demonstrating that cognitive functioning may play a signifi-
cant role in political attitude, and thus should focus on finding common ground rather than demand-
ing "conversion" of position. See, e.g., Michael D. Dodd et al., The Political Left Rolls with the
Good and the Political Right Confronts the Bad: Connecting Physiology and Cognition to Prefer-
ences, 367 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y B 640, 640 (2012), available at
http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/367/1589/640.full.pdf (finding that left-leaning indi-
viduals prefer pleasing images while right-leaning individuals prefer unpleasant images); Scott
Eidelman et al., Low-Effort Thought Promotes Political Conservatism, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 808, 808-09, 815, 817 (2012) ("[P]olitical conservatism is promoted when people
rely on low-effort thinking. When effortful, deliberate responding is disrupted or disengaged,
thought processes become quick and efficient; these conditions promote conservative ideology....
[L]ow-effort thought might promote political conservatism because its concepts are easier to pro-
cess, and processing fluency increases attitude endorsement. ... Four studies support our assertion
that low-effort thinking promotes political conservatism.... Our findings suggest that conservative
ways of thinking are basic, normal, and perhaps natural." (citation omitted)); Peter K. Hatemi et al.,
Genetic and Environmental Transmission of Political Attitudes over a Life Time, 71 J. POL. 1141,
1141 (2009) ("[A]t the point of early adulthood (in the early 20s), for those who left their parental
home, there is evidence of a sizeable genetic influence on political attitudes which remains stable
throughout adult life."); Erik G. Helzer & David A. Pizarro, Dirty Liberals! Reminders of Physical
Cleanliness Influence Moral and Political Attitudes, 22 PSYCHOL. Scl 517, 517 (2011)
("[R]eminders of physical purity influence specific moral judgments regarding behaviors in the
sexual domain as well as broad political attitudes."); Ryota Kanai et al., Political Orientations Are
Correlated with Brain Structure in Young Adults, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 677, 677-79 (2011) (find-
ing that left-leaning individuals are more tolerant of uncertainty while conservatives have greater
sensitivity to fear as demonstrated in different parts of the brain); Natalie J. Shook & Russell H.
Fazio, Political Ideology, Exploration of Novel Stimuli, and Attitude Formation, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 995, 995-96 (2009) (stating that, compared to liberals, conservatives
are less open to new experiences and learn better from negative stimuli than positive stimuli); Jacob
M. Vigil, Political Leanings Vary with Facial Expression Processing and Psychosocial Functioning,
13 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 547, 552 (2010) ("Republican sympathizers were more
likely to interpret the faces as signaling a threatening expression . . . as compared to Democrat sym-
pathizers .... Group differences were also found for dominance perceptions, . . . whereby Republi-
can sympathizers were more likely to perceive the faces as expressing dominant emotions . . . than
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One way to re-engage the middle class is to discuss the value of
human life. Rather than pour political energy into birth control and abor-
tion (both important and necessary social policies-but also potentially
alienating issues amongst the religious middle class), we should focus on
the need to invest in children from the start. Recall, this study shows a
strong correlation between DOMA states and its citizens reporting con-
servatism and religion as an important part of daily life.233 Thus, a dis-
cussion of policy reform must reframe the discussion in such a way that
is respectful to the religious and moral views of the middle class; for
example, prioritize prenatal and early childhood care.
By adopting a "trickle up" policy, money invested in children can
234mitigate some of the weak income levels of their parents. And how do
we pay for these investments? Revise the tax code to address the massive
and growing economic injustice in this country. Government may not be
able to dictate the ratio of pay between worker and CEO, but government
can redistribute resources and income through tax policy.235 The earned
income tax credit is one of the most effective tax policies to benefit fami-
1-236lies.
One highly effective investment is supporting low-income parents
in developing strong relationships with their children. Research demon-
were Democrat sympathizers . . . ."); Darren M. Schreiber et al., Red Brain, Blue Brain: Evaluative
Processes Differ in Democrats and Republicans 2-3 (2009) (unpublished APSA Toronto meeting
paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1451867 ("[Ilt appears in
our experiment that Republican participants, when making a risky choice, are predominantly exter-
nally oriented, reacting to the fear-related processes with a tangible potential external consequence.
In comparison, risky decisions made by Democratic participants appear to be associated with moni-
toring how the selection of a risky response might feel internally."); Kevin B. Smith et al., Disgust
Sensitivity and the Neurophysiology of Left-Right Political Orientations, PLOS ONE (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2Fl0.1371 %2Fjournal.pone.0025552 ("[I]ndividuals
with marked involuntary physiological responses to disgusting images [measured by change in mean
skin conductance], such as of a man eating a large mouthful of writhing worms, are more likely to
self-identify as conservative and, especially, to oppose gay marriage than are individuals with more
muted physiological responses to the same images.").
233. See supra Part I.C.
234. This Article offers a couple of the multitude of policies that will need addressing. Welfare
reform, for example, demands significant attention if poor children are to gain access to resources
that mirror children in two-parent households. Greg Kaufmann, This Week in Poverty: The Invisibles
in Mississippi and the US, NATION (Sept. 28, 2012, 09:01 EST),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/170222/week-poverty-invisibles-mississippi-and-us#. Social security
reform represents another area that significantly impacts poor children. Christopher R. Tamborini et
al., A Profile of Social Security Child Beneficiaries and Their Families: Sociodemographic and
Economic Characteristics, 71 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 1, 1, 11 (2011), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v71nl/v71nlpl.html.
235. A report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities identified some actions that could
improve the lives of the poor and reduce inequality. First among them was reforming state tax policy
to make it progressive rather than regressive. ELIZABETH MCNICHOL ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES, ECON. POLICY INST., PULLING APART: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF
INCOME TRENDS 10, 52-54 (2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/1 1-15-12sfp.pdf.
Next, improve unemployment insurance and raise and index the minimum wage. Id at 10, 49-51.
236. CHUCK MARR & CHYE-CHING HUANG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT PROMOTES WORK, ENCOURAGES CHILDREN'S SUCCESS AT SCHOOL,
RESEARCH FINDS 1-2 (2014), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-26-12tax.pdf.
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strates that the characteristics necessary for a child's success in life are
not based on genetics, but on brain chemistry.237 Children who grow up
under chronic stress are less likely to possess strong executive function-
ing.238 Executive functioning is a key predictor of a child's ability to suc-
ceed in school.239 Yet, chronic stress is strongly correlated with living in
poverty.240 Thus, it would appear that poor children are destined to repeat
the cycle of poverty. Not so.
A fascinating study measuring the effects of environmental stress on
children found that their cortisol levels-a hormonal response to stress-
spike when they experienced stress.241 However, a child's cortisol level
did not spike when encountering a stressful environment if the parent
was attentive and responsive to the child.242 In other words, parents who
can develop nurturing relationships with their children can mitigate the
effects of stress associated with living in a harsh environment, and in
turn, increase their children's executive functioning and ability to suc-
ceed in school.243
Thus, neuroscientists don't point to a particular type of family form
to ensure a child's chances of success, but rather a particular type of par-
ent-child relationship. 244 One study revealed a 77% success rate at pre-
dicting whether a child would graduate from high school based on the
parental care the child received in his or her early years. 245 As expected,
though, developing these parenting skills in a harsh environment is not
an easy task. Such programs exist, but demand an investment in re-
sources. Early childhood programs like Head Start, long considered one
of the most successful federal government "War on Poverty" programs
created, works with parents to support family stability. 2" One forty-year
longitudinal study that followed children into adulthood who had attend-
ed the Perry Preschool Project in a poverty-stricken neighborhood in
Michigan, found that the program led to profound social and economic
benefits.247 The graduates of the preschool program were "more likely to
237. Gary W. Evans & Michelle A. Schamberg, Childhood Poverty, Chronic Stress, and Adult
Working Memory, 16 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sol. U.S. 6545, 6545, 6548 (2009).
238. Id. "Executive functioning" refers to the ability of the brain to manage confusing and
conflicting information-the type of information that children encounter and must negotiate con-
stantly in school. PAUL TOUGH, How CHILDREN SUCCEED: GRIT, CURIOSITY, AND THE HIDDEN
POWER OF CHARACTER 18 (2012).
239. See TOUGH, supra note 238, at 18.
240. Id. at 20.
241. Clancy Blair et al., Salivary Cortisol Mediates Effects of Poverty and Parenting on Execu-
tive Functions in Early Childhood, 82 CHILD DEv. 1970, 1970, 1979 (2011).
242. Id. at 1970, 1978-80.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. L. ALAN SROUFE ET AL., THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON: THE MINNESOTA STUDY OF
RISK AND ADAPTATION FROM BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD 210-11 (2005).
246. See Head Start of Morris County, NJ, HEAD START COMMUNITY PROGRAM MORRIS
COUNTY, INC., http://headstartmc.org/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2014).
247. TOUGH, supra note 238, at xix-xx.
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graduate from high school, more likely to be employed at age twenty-
seven, more likely to be earning more than twenty-five thousand dollars
a year at age forty, less likely ever to have been arrested, and less likely
to have spent time on welfare" than children who had not attended the
program.248 Recall that education and income were significant predictors
of family stability.249 Thus, the cycle of family instability that seems to
plague poor families is not inevitable.
We do not need to reinvent the wheel. It can seem overwhelming
and hopeless to believe that any kind of meaningful redistribution of
resources is likely to occur. In fact, it may appear naive to believe that
even modest increased funding for social support networks is possible in
our current economic climate. Yet, research shows that this kind of re-
source investment actually yields tangible returns.250 Heckman analyzed
the Perry Preschool Project and found that for every dollar invested in
the program, a yield of seven to twelve dollars found its way into the
economy. 251 These children developed non-cognitive skills like curiosity,
social fluidity, and social control that served them well throughout life.252
These are the same skills mirrored in affluent family structures, which
contribute to a child's success in life.253 Institutional support at the macro
level, though, will not succeed alone in creating family stability. At the
micro level, a cultural shift in individual interactions must occur-the
focus of the next section.
2. Renewing the Cultural Value of Respect
The second element that must be the focus of attention if the family,
in whatever form, is to experience stability is the resurgence of the cul-
tural value of respect. The desire for a marginalized group to speak out
and ask for the same rights and access to resources should not be met
with condemnation or scapegoating. 254 But even more pragmatically, we
should interact with our political, religious, and socioeconomic plurali-
248. Id at xx.
249. See supra Part I.D.
250. TOUGH, supra note 238, at 196.
251. Id.
252. Id. at xx.
253. See id. at 76.
254. Something very wrong is present in a culture in which the media pays an individual to
write or declare contemptuous things about others--especially those with less social power. For
example, after observing the speeches of the first night of the Democratic National Convention, in
which Michelle Obama, Lilly Ledbetter, and Tammy Buckworth spoke, CNN commentator Erick
Erickson tweeted, "First night of the Vagina Monologues . . . going as expected." CNN: Fire Erick
Erickson, ULTRA VIOLET, http://act.weareultraviolet.org/sign/erickson/?source=so%3E (last visited
Apr. 13, 2014) (quoting Erick Erickson, TWITTER (Sept. 4, 2012, 5:31 PM),
hups://twitter.com/EWErickson/status/243144183529996288) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Such comments can be viewed as nothing more than contempt. When Sandra Fluke spoke up de-
manding access to birth control in the new health care law, Rush Limbaugh called her a slut. Jack
Mirkinson, Rush Limbaugh: Sandra Fluke, Woman Denied Right to Speak at Contraception Hear-
ing, a Slut,' HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 29, 2012, 9:26 PM),
http://www.huflingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/rush-limbaugh-sandra-fluke-slut n1311640.html.
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ties with respect. As Harvard political philosopher Michael Sandel ob-
served, "a better way to mutual respect is to engage directly with the
moral convictions citizens bring to public life, rather than to require that
people leave their deepest moral convictions outside politics before they
enter." 255 Indeed, we should interact with children and parents with re-
spect because structural reform is not enough. Interpersonal behaviors
matter too.
Research reveals that the concept of respect, more so than any other
traditional measure of relationship success, determines relationship satis-
faction-more so than love, likeability, personality, or attachment.256 In
Frei and Shaver's study, the results showed that, regardless of whether
respondents were considering what respect means for the general public
or for a romantic partner, five key concepts emerged.257 Respect was
associated with a person who had good morals, was considerate, listened,
was honest, and was accepting of other viewpoints. 258 Moreover, the
researchers observed that the practice of respect actually engendered
more respect.259 Other research by Sara Lawrence-Lightfoot demonstrat-
ed that respect brought reciprocal benefits.260 Based on her research re-
sults, she encouraged a reformulation of the concept of respect not as
something accorded to someone in power, but rather grounded in empa-
thy and connectedness in a place of equality-regardless of each party's
social or economic status.261 All the researchers agreed that respect was
the opposite of contempt.262
Reinvigorating the concept of respect may better serve us in moving
towards a policy that supports social structures that will promote family
stability. However, respect must operate at both the individual and group
level in order for the necessary individual and social structural pieces to
successfully coalesce. As Coontz observed, "The problem is not to berate
people for abandoning past family values, nor to exhort them to adopt
better values in the future-the problem is to build the institutions and
social support networks that allow people to act on their best values ra-
ther than on their worst ones."263
255. Michael Sandel, Anne T. & Robert M. Bass Professor of Gov't, Harvard Univ., Talk
presented at official TED Conference: The Lost Art of Democratic Debate (Feb. 2010), available at
http://www.ted.com/talks/michael sandel-thelost art-of democratic-debate.html.
256. Jennifer R. Frei & Phillip R. Shaver, Respect in Close Relationships: Prototype Defini-
tion, Self-Report Assessment, and Initial Correlates, 9 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 121, 135 (2002).
257. Id at 125.
258. Id at 125, 128.
259. Id at 122, 128.
260. SARA LAWRENCE-LIGHTFOOT, RESPECT: AN ExPLORATION 9-10 (2000).
261. Id.
262. Frei & Shaver, supra note 256, at 121-22.
263. COONTZ, supra note 179, at 22.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the extent to which state DOMAs are as-
sociated with their intended objective of increasing family stability. The
goal of the Article is to move the discourse and political-legal analysis
beyond whether DOMAs can promote family stability (they do not) to
considering means for achieving family stability for all family types
within a broad moral framework in a post-DOMA America. It may be
that those in power seek to maintain their power through the use of moral
panics, but the discourse of same-sex marriage as a threat to "traditional
families" seems off the mark. It is a distraction. After all, polls now show
that from 1988 to 2010, the gap between support of or opposition to gay
marriage has narrowed rapidly and significantly;264 but the gap between
well-to-do versus hard-off and family stability and family volatility has
widened considerably. 265 Other industrial countries have managed to
welcome other family forms-including same-sex marriage-and yet
maintain family stability through the use of child-centered economic and
266
social policies. Our goal should be to develop a policy that lets fami-
lies thrive.267 Marriage should not be a social objective in and of itself,
conceived from a singular hetero-normative notion. Rather, marriage
should be one possible outcome of many from within an evolving family
and child-oriented policy. 268
264. Nate Silver, Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage Appears to Shifi at Accelerated Pace,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHTPOLITICS (Aug. 12, 2010, 12:44 PM),
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2010/08/opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-appears-to.html. In fact,
51% of Americans are now in favor of same-sex marriage, and 72% believe that it is inevitable that
it will become the law of the land. PEW RESEARCH CTR., IN GAY MARRIAGE DEBATE, BOTH
SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS SEE LEGAL RECOGNITION AS 'INEVITABLE' 1 (2013), available at
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-06-
13%20LGBT%2OGeneral%2OPublic%2ORelease.pdf.
265. STIGLITZ,supra note 196, at 19;seesupra Part 1.B.l.
266. Sixty percent of Norwegian families are married couples with children, despite allowing
for same-sex marriage. Fifty-five percent of Finnish families include married couples with children,
despite allowing for same-sex marriage. Sixty-three percent of Canadian families have married
parents with children, despite allowing for same-sex marriage. Seventy-eight percent of families in
the Netherlands comprise of married parents with children, despite allowing for same-sex marriage.
Fifty-one percent of Icelandic families contain married parents with children, despite allowing for
same-sex marriage. Various family structures thrive and do not threaten "traditional" family models
because these countries have far more generous economic and social policies devoted to children.
267. See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 10 (2008); Clare Huntington, Flourishing Families: Harnessing Law
to Foster Strong, Stable, Positive Relationships (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.ubalt.edulcenters/caf/pdf/Huntington.pdf.
268. The Windsor decision moves us one small step closer in that direction. See United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013).
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APPENDIX A
MARRIAGE CALCULATED SLOPES FOR EACH STATE
State Pre Post
AK
AL -0.190 -0.240
AR -0.371 -0.486
AZ -0.201 0.300
CA 0.033 0.000
CO -0.143 -0.080
CT 0.011 0.060
DC -0.286 0.770
DE -0.132 -0.170
FL -0.085 -0.200
GA -0.190 -0.139
HI 0.625 -1.220
IA -0.075
ID -0.200 -0.420
IL -0.193 -0.140
IN -0.164 -0.050
KS -0.146 -0.120
KY -0.360 -0.251
LA
MA 0.029 -0.090
MD -0.111 -0.250
ME -0.064 -0.170
MI -0.126 -0.131
MN -0.154 -0.190
MO -0.200 -0.109
MS -0.306 -0.214
MT 0.006 -0.006
NC -0.193 -0.180
ND 0.043 -0.071
NE
NH -0.179 -0.040
NJ -0.050 -0.120
NM -0.218 0.120
NV -4.730 -4.012
2014] 27
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NY -0.104 -0.110
OH -0.271 -0.146
OK 0.039
OR 0.026 -0.183
PA -0.036 -0.120
RI -0.057 -0.210
SC -0.401 -0.150
SD -0.174 -0.190
TN -0.705 -0.490
TX -0.275 -0.130
UT -0.003 -0.271
VA -0.173 -0.240
VT -0.164 0.160
WA -0.121 -0.140
WI -0.106 -0.150
WV -0.111 -0.180
WY -0.139 -0.440
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DIVORCE SLOPES CALCULATED FOR EACH STATE
State Pre Post
AK
AL -0.123 -0.020
AR -0.049 -0.063
AZ -0.081 -0.100
CA
CO -0.071 -0.050
CT -0.014 -0.060
DC -0.304 0.240
DE -0.089 -0.070
FL -0.091 0.200
GA -0.260
HI -0.020
IA -0.096
ID -0.075 0.110
IL -0.132 0.010
IN
KS -0.057 0.140
KY -0.091 -0.049
LA
MA -0.050 0.030
MD -0.011 -0.050
ME -0.168 -0.010
MI -0.080 -0.003
MN -0.077
MO -0.143 0.040
MS -0.109 -0.080
MT 0.111 -0.117
NC -0.089 -0.060
ND -0.229 0.011
NE
NH -0.196 -0.070
NJ -0.018 -0.030
NM -0.025 -0.090
NV -0.750 -0.128
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NY -0.054 -0.070
OH -0.086 -0.034
OK -0.025
OR -0.120 -0.037
PA -0.093 -0.030
RI 0.043 0.060
Sc -0.144 0.050
SD -0.094 0.110
TN -0.189 -0.060
TX -0.089 -0.020
UT -0.014 -0.071
VA -0.064 -0.010
VT -0.111 -0.010
WA -0.100 0.010
WI -0.043 0.020
WV 0.014 0.020
WY -0.111 0.020
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APPENDIX E
Amendment Statutory
Civil
Unions
Domestic
Partnership Same-Sex
AK 1996 1996
AL 2006 1998
AR 2004 2005
AZ 2008 1996
CA 2008 2000 2007
CO 2006 2006 2013 2009
CT 2009
DC 2010
DE 2009 2011 2013
FL 2008 1997
GA 2004 1996
HI 1998 2012
IA 2009
ID 2006 1996
IL 2006 2011
IN 1997
KS 2005
KY 2004 1998
LA 2004 1999
MA 2003
MD 2006 2012
ME 199 2004 2012
MI 2004 1996
MN 1997
MO 2004 2001
MS 2004
MT 2004 1997
NC 2012 1996
ND 2004 1997
2014] 33
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NE 2000
NH 2010
NJ 2007
NM Other Jdx
NV 202 2009 2011
NY
OH 2004 2004
OK 2004 1997
OR 2004 2011
PA 1996
RI 2011 2013
SC 2006 1996
SD 2006 2000
TN 2006 1996
TX 2005 2003
UT 2004 2004
VA 2006 2004
VT 2000 2009
WA 499- 2009 2012
WI 2007 2009 2013
Wv 2001
WY 1977
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